YES PM

Years of Experience in Strategies for Peace Making

Looking at Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People Activities
1993-2002

December 2002
This paper is dedicated to the loving memory of two teachers – one Israeli and one Palestinian - who believed in peace and who taught peace to their students.

They were both active in IPCRI’s Peace Education Project and they were both killed by acts of terrorism.

*Isaaq Saada was killed on July 17, 2001.*

*Orna Eshel was killed on October 29, 2002.*
Introduction

This study is the collective work of tens of Israelis and Palestinians who have dedicated their lives to peace building between the people of Israel and Palestine. Since before the Oslo peace process began in 1993, many of the participants of this study have working daily to build contacts between individuals and groups of Israelis and Palestinians. The field of People-to-People activities, as it has commonly become known, has experienced wide criticism over the past years by protagonists and antagonists alike. This study is written by the protagonists of People-to-People. The study is, nevertheless, a critical, subjective, and probing look at the field of Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People peace making. The study report integrates within the text direct quotes, placed in frames and printed in italics. These quotes are taken from interviews and workshops with Israeli and Palestinian People-to-People activists and experts. They appear as anonymous quotations. They were selected to provide additional first hand emphasis on the points raised within the analysis. The quotations selected represent majority opinions expressed within the study.

While this study provides in-depth self criticism, the reader should also understand that this criticism emanates from a universal desire of all of those who participated to continue this work with a deep sense of commitment and with a sincere desire to improve the work of People-to-People peace making. This study was conducted as a “community wide” endeavor and should be viewed as reflecting the opinion of the main activists – Israelis and Palestinians – in the field of People-to-People. This study has in itself, also served as a means of continuing the joint work between Israelis and Palestinians.

We would like to thank the Government of the United Kingdom for its support and its initiative in taking a leading role in advancing the work of Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People peace making.

IPCRI – Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information
December 2002
http://www.ipcri.org
http://www.place4peace.com
http://www.our-shared-environment.net
About This Study

The British Consul General in Jerusalem and the British Embassy in Tel Aviv contracted IPCRI (Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information)\(^1\) to conduct a detailed study on how to increase and strengthen the impact of future Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People initiatives.

The Oslo Peace Process was largely framed as a “top-down” strategy for achieving peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The strategy was based on reaching political agreements between the Government of Israel and the PLO. The expectation was that political agreements between the leaders would significantly change the realities on the ground and the peoples of both sides would then support the process. Almost as an afterthought, the sides added to the Oslo II agreement an annex calling for the institution of People-to-People (P2P) projects as a means of strengthening peace between the two peoples. The international community embraced the agreements and the idea of People-to-People projects. Since September 1993 until September 2000 an estimated $20-$25 million dollars was allocated for funding people-to-people projects mainly through NGO’s and Civil Society institutions in Israel and Palestine. There were also many international organizations, NGO’s and universities who joined the “parade” and profited from the funds available.

In September 2000 the *Al Aqsa Intifada* erupted virtually putting an end to the People-to-People projects. Many people, locally and internationally have asked why did this happen? Why did the people-to-people projects cease to work when they were critically needed most? Why did the people-to-people projects fail to produce the desired goals? Was there a strategy for funding these projects? How could people-to-people project have greater impact? Why are some activities continuing while others have ceased?

\(^1\)http://www.ipcri.org
The Research

The aim of this research was to address the implications of the above questions through a systematic approach involving the proponents and antagonists of the people-to-people concept. The research project involved Israeli and Palestinian NGO’s and Civil Society Institutions, academics – Israeli, Palestinian, and internationals, the donors to the people-to-people projects, and other expert conflict resolution and conflict prevention practitioners from other parts of the world.

The Project Activities

1. Research and Analysis - A joint team of Israeli and Palestinian researchers was appointed to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the people-to-people process. The researchers described the various typologies of the people-to-people strategies used during the past years.

2. Two workshops were held to conduct subjective analyses of the people-to-people process from the outset until today. The issues examined included:
   a. Planning strategies
   b. Target populations
   c. Expected and resulting impacts
   d. Experiences and lessons regarding partnering with the other side
   e. Difficulties encountered
   f. Reasons for successes
   g. Reasons for failures
   h. Why has the process ceased?
   i. How can it be continued?
   j. Lessons and plans for the future

3. A three-day workshop was held in Antalya, Turkey with a selected group of Israelis and Palestinians (26 in number) representing institutions and NGO’s who have been involved in the people-to-people programs.

4. An interactive web site was produced containing written assessments of people, institutions, donors, academics, locals and internationals on the people-to-people concepts and strategies.

5. Some 40 interviews were conducted with initiators and implementers of People-to-People projects, Israelis and Palestinians serving as a sample representing the breath of the field.
Main Parameters of the Study

It is important to note that this report is the result of the collective work of tens of people, activists and proponents of People-to-People activities. There was a great deal of self criticism and self reflection from all of the participants in this process. This is not an academic and detached evaluation of People-to-People projects and activities. In fact, we did not encounter one person who voiced objection to the notion of People-to-People. We did encounter a lot of honest assessing by individuals and organizations who place a high value on People-to-People and who are interested in seeing this work continue and improve in the present and future. This work can therefore be described as analytical advocacy. This is a subjective report yet critical. We hope that the readers, NGO's engaging in People-to-People work, donors, and those who are interested in joining the work in the field will gain from the years of experiences of those who have undertaken this work until now.

There were four major issues that were examined in the research. The question of strategies: is it possible to develop coherent, comprehensive strategies for people-to-people. We asked the question: If we were beginning a new people-to-people process, could we determine what should be done, who should be the target audiences, which kinds of activities should be undertaken.

The second major issue related to how to increase the impact of People-to-People. Public opinion polls in Israel and Palestine over the past year have indicated that only half a percent of Israelis and half a percent of Palestinians have met people from the other side as a result of peace-oriented -- meaning people-to-people -- activities. This shows we really have a problem with impact. So how do we reach more people? How do we develop a process that will involve more people in positive interactions?

In this context, we also discussed the issue of the media. Much of the work we have done over the years has been in closed rooms. We've stayed away from the media. When we reached out to them, they weren't interested. It's been difficult to get the media interested when we've had good stories to tell.

The third major issue relates to partnering and partnerships. Most of the Israeli-Palestinian activities that took place were not conducted by organizations like IPCRI or Friends of the Earth or Windows -- joint Israeli-Palestinian organizations -- but rather by a partnership of Israeli and Palestinian organizations. We know there were lots of problems in these partnerships. So we addressed the issue of how can we recommend to improve these kinds of partnerships? What are some of the key lessons we have learned that would facilitate better relationships? One of the
observations has been that the chances of success of these joint projects are increased when there's a good partnership between the initiators, the people running the programs.

The fourth major issue confronts the relationship between the People-to-People and dialogue NGO's and the donors. How do we, as a community of recipients, participate in shaping the donors' agenda? How do we improve coordination amongst ourselves, and then also amongst the donors, so the donors support projects that we believe will have the biggest impact on creating a civil society-based peace process?

The Research Team:

Dr. Gershon Baskin – Project Coordinator
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Context of P2P

Any attempt to describe the socio-political backdrop for P2P activity necessarily reveals its contested nature. Palestinians and Israelis do not share the same narrative and therefore do not necessarily agree on the points of departure from which one may contextualize the political, economic and social circumstances surrounding the violence and deteriorating relations between the two societies.

The purpose of this section is to identify the larger social and political forces and factors at play in both societies, in as much as they are brought to bear on the undertaking of P2P and the activities of the P2P community. This context specifically relates to the last two years, which have impacted upon and informed thinking and action relating to P2P.

In the Oslo accords and subsequent agreements between the Israeli government and the PLO (later, the Palestinian Authority), a provision was made for the undertaking of P2P activity. By bringing together ordinary Israeli and Palestinians for dialogue and cooperative ventures, P2P would ideally create the relational infrastructure necessary to advance and increase support for the official peace process being negotiated at the political level.

However, as agents of civil society, these peace building NGOs are indigenous to the societies in which they operate and as such, are not impervious to the influences of external events, particularly the adverse circumstances of violence, human suffering and the escalation of tensions. It should therefore come as no surprise that, during the current round of violence between Israelis and Palestinians, termed by some as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Israeli NGOs devoted to pursuing P2P activity with Palestinian partners have experienced a dramatic and some might argue, traumatic change in the nature and frequency of the activity they undertake. The perception of many is that recent events have virtually demolished the extensive web of P2P activity that had gradually been formed during the years since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. Hence, whereas only two years ago, a dramatic proliferation and what one might coin a veritable “industry” of P2P projects was in evidence, today many of these same projects appear to have ground to a halt.

I. The Israeli Context

Since the events of October 2000, the coming of the second Intifada, public opinion in Israel has shifted significantly. According to the findings of a survey conducted by
Dr. Mina Tzemach released last year, “only 38% of Israel's citizens and 36% of its Jewish citizens believe that it is possible to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians. A compelling majority of 61% to 63% had given up on the idea of peace all together (this trend has continued through out 2002 as well). The popular opinion among the Israeli public is that the Palestinians have let them down, walked out on the peace process, and are not interested in peace. Attempts to counteract this “conventional wisdom” have been forged since the outset of the Intifada by various factions within the Israeli peace camp through the use of the mass media including high profile bill board campaigns, demonstrations and public symposia. These activities have been characterized by a call for the need for hope and the desire to see an alternative to the Israeli National Unity government policy. In the immediate aftermath of the beginning of the violence, in fact, the loose network, Israeli Forum for People to People Organizations placed ads in Israeli and Palestinian newspapers to counteract the growing entrenchment of Israeli public opinion (See Appendix II).

Other studies, most notably the Steinmitz Peace Index of Tel Aviv University have observed the seeming paradox of significant Jewish Israeli support for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the one hand and the surprisingly high level of support for the Israeli government and its policies led by Prime Minister Sharon.

The sober perception of many P2P leaders is that the Israeli public has lost trust in the Israeli peace camp and its messages.

The results of the recent events on the ground, the increased violence and mistrust, and the despair on both sides has prompted a stock-taking on part of Israeli peace NGO’s. Amongst the growing unpopularity of the peace camp positions in the public Israeli discourse and as a result of the national unity government, the hostile atmosphere has brought about questions of the relevance of the message and of a retreat regarding strategies and tactics. People to People has returned to be mainly the intellectual and ideological property of the peace camp and not the outreach tool to advance and increase support for the peace process amongst non-traditional constituencies e.g. observant Jews, Russian immigrants etc. A tactical issue, which was raised by an Israeli Peace NGO professional, was the onus on the Israeli Peace Camp to ensure better flow of information in order to more accurately reflect their work. One clear implication of this difficult context is the constant struggle to fight the de-legitimization and marginalization of the ongoing work of and activism of the Israeli Peace NGO’s realities.

Some activists have questioned ‘from within’ the relevance of P2P strategy in this turbulent and unpopular context. While the disappointment of not seeing an implementation of peace and despair at the current level of violence has caused some

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2 Dahaf Insitute, April 2001
stakeholders to abandon their efforts, for others the reality has simply caused them to be less ambitious in their desires:

"I am willing to swim against the tide even when others are retreating. My connection with Sami was sometimes more meaningful than with some of my Jewish colleagues. I have arguments within my own family about this and I have definitely become more stubborn. I don’t interpret current realities as dictating to me a retreat from what is we are doing. I don’t plan to sacrifice myself on this altar of peace etc. but I won’t give up easily either."

My experience with the Jewish-German link gave me a perspective on how slow and gradual this kind of work is. It isn’t sure we’ll see the results, at best we’ll see the beginnings of such results. There will be many ups and downs along the way.

The commitment to the necessity and belief in the efficacy of P2P efforts in these times is reflected in the words of another veteran Israeli peace activist.

"People are more ready now, in spite of all the anger they feel towards the Palestinians, to listen to explanations about the situation. And they're making the connections between the economic situation and the political situation. A lot more should be done to reach these people, these organizations, and through them, to reach the street."

The stifling socio-political context in Israel has brought about a subsequent decline of the legitimacy of P2P and all peace building efforts and a retreat of P2P back into its natural womb amongst the Israeli Peace NGO’s. Consequently, P2P actors have been relegated to the unavoidable role of advocating for the basic legitimacy and relevance of their positions, while continuing to forge all efforts to maintain the web of communication and cooperation with their Palestinian colleagues.

**II. The Palestinian context**

While the situation on the Israeli end has led to a political and organizational stock-taking, the profile of P2P on the Palestinian side is even more beleaguered given the rise of extremism and violence, and the frequent incursions of the IDF into Palestine. Parallel to this clear trend is a seemingly contradictory phenomenon amongst Palestinian NGO’s, which cautiously and usually discreetly, choose to selectively reconsider the strong anti-normalization line which characterized growing numbers of players in Palestinian civil society. This ‘reconsideration’ is part and parcel of the ‘solidarity’ stream of P2P activities which has incrementally enabled a growing re-engagement of Palestinian NGO’s with their former or new Israeli partners from the peace movement. This has been most visibly expressed by the shift taken by many Palestinian NGO’S which have members of the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO), which in spring 2000, had set a strong anti-engagement line (See Appendix III).
Interestingly, the Palestinian (National) Authority, aside from its Ministry of Education, never formally banned P2P activities pre or post- Al Aqsa Intifada. The Authority’s “non-ban” serves to pronounce the original PNGO anti-normalization Declaration, which sent shock waves throughout Palestinian civil society and a loud and clear message to Israel P2P NGO’s. PNGO’s members more recent conciliatory tone indicates a shift back towards re-engagement.

Many Palestinians NGO leaders and activists recognize the knowledge and skills that were gained through the P2P process and beyond its situational political value, is perceived as a source of Palestinian capacity building.

**Clearly, a vacuum has been left due to the crumbling of the Palestinian (National) Authority. The political void left by the de-legitimization of the PA will have serious repercussions for years to come unless there is a serious intervention on the part of Palestinian Civil Society.**

We should look at this as an imminent danger, and at the same time, as a golden opportunity because of the present vacuum. This is the first time that Palestinian civil society has an open field. If it can reach out and find the right partnership that will enable it in a very short time to start doing what it has to do. This is the issue.

Similarly, the present situation, the frequent incursions of the IDF, and curfews over the past year have left many Palestinians destitute, and the battle over the public will be won by those most able to provide a viable social network:

**Poverty will encourage many of these people to be more aggressive. And on the social side, whoever is able to work with these people, give them food, create a social network to provide them supplies, is going to win these people over. This is a very significant because it's just before the upcoming elections.**

If you look at it from this angle, you'll see that, for example, nowadays, Islamic organizations like Hamas still have an operating supportive social network. The Palestinian Authority has very little, if anything left. Even Fatah, who has somehow maybe sabotaged their own structures by adapting to the Palestinian Authority, doesn't have the power they had in the first Intifada because they participated in the Authority. They considered it theirs, and now the Authority has been hit. They didn't maintain any social structure to help the people, to deal with people on that side.

The extreme situation has led Palestinians NGO workers fear being labeled collaborators, now more than ever. One insight into people-to-people was that, when we were trying to conduct the interviews under Intifada conditions, many of the people who had worked with and benefited from people-to-people projects, who had received money to conduct these activities, said, Are you kidding? Are you serious? You're talking about people-to-people? Where is people-to-people? We are now in a conflict. This is Intifada. We should not be talking to Israelis. We should not even be thinking in terms of this concept.
In summary, what once could have been described as the fragile status of People to People in the Palestinian context pre-October 2000 can be more aptly understood as a phenomenon, that with rare exception has almost publicly fallen into seemingly complete disrepute, alongside ongoing mostly discreet efforts to maintain webs of cooperation and dialogue with Israeli colleagues and fellow activists.

III. Emergency Strategy: Shift of P2P Paradigm to Solidarity, Relief and Humanitarian Activities

The centrality of P2P as the primary force for peace building, in the contexts described above has become largely subsumed under what many have called ‘solidarity’, ‘relief’ or humanitarian’ activities. (More detailed definition of these terms in ‘Definitions’ chapter)

The result of the situation on the ground begs not only for stronger coordination on the part of peace NGO’s internally and cross border, but more emphasis on capacity-building, strengthening of Palestinian NGO’s, and more advocacy. The refrain heard over and over, particularly on the part of Palestinian P2P practitioners is that the previous P2P paradigm must be shifted entirely to address the emergency situation in order to have any relevance on the ground:

> With the onset of the Intifada, we have seen a lot more violence. And now, a few weeks ago, these high-level officials on both sides, including representatives of key economic ministries in Israel, were telling us, we have no impact whatsoever on what the army is doing or is going to do in the West Bank. We are not being consulted and we cannot change what is going on. This means that the NGO’s here now have a dual responsibility. When all else fails, then it’s up to civil society on both sides to deal with these things.

> But Palestinian civil society, NGO’s, especially those NGO’s working on people-to-people programs for dialogue, for development, for conflict resolution, cannot do that alone. They are very fragmented. More or less, with some exceptions, they have very primitive or zero capacities. They need support and partnership. They need Israeli support and partnership from their counterparts, and they need world support and partnership. Then they will be able to play an important role in filling that vacuum.
A further challenge posed to the peace stake-holders is to identify leadership which seeks better alternatives:

> And it's also providing that we can identify a charismatic leader who can set the moral tone and pave the way. This is perhaps the first challenge that we have to look at on both sides of the conflict line. In Israel we also have a dearth of leadership. There is a real void in our camp, as there is on the Palestinian side. In my e-mails, over the past year and a half, I have been writing about civil society bottom-up processes, civil society contracts on both sides. Most of the responses that support the idea say, 'it's a wonderful idea, but give us the operational plan. And the operational plan usually is, when you look at similar movements in other societies, a charismatic leader who stands up and serves as the model and says follow me. Look at what happened throughout Eastern Europe with the fall of Communism. There was always a small group of individuals or a single leader who catalyzed a mass movement in the streets, the parliaments, the main squares, that brought down the fall of those governments. The question is, do we have those people. I think we do. There are some people out there. What can we do to strengthen them, to give them the courage to help push this forward.

Many Palestinians interviewed strongly felt that the fight for Palestinian public opinion can be significantly achieved through relief work and visible solidarity on the part of the Israeli Camp. A highly visible, though not singular example of this approach is reflected in the work of the new Tayaoush organization.

> Tayaoush is a joint Jewish and Palestinian Israeli organization that began working just after this current Intifada started. It's not really an organization. They hold forums every week or so where they discuss their programs. They only now are becoming a registered NGO. So far they've worked as volunteers. Many of them are also active in other organizations. They do field work. They organize convoys of food or humanitarian aid to check points. They brought about 40 trucks of aid to Jenin when the army was there. Or, when possible in area C, they bring truckloads of food and aid right to the villages. In a week or two they're going to Salfit to a new hospital being built there, bringing medical Support and other things.
The Palestinian need for loud and resonant expressions and actions of solidarity is reflected in the following activist’s assessment.

_We had a real crisis in Jenin, and we're experiencing a lot of problems there right now. I would have expected some peace-loving Israelis to maybe arrange some doctors to help. The Israelis think it's too dangerous to come right now, but they have the wrong impression. Despite everything, people are still capable of distinguishing between peace-loving people and the army and the artillery and tanks and F-16's and all that._

_When they know exactly who is behind it, a peace-supporting party in Israel that is doing something against the will of the Israeli government, people appreciate that. And people would also appreciate it if people would come across the border. I am talking about Israeli Jews, not Israeli Arabs who do try to come across the border with support and medications. On some occasions the Israeli army did not allow them to go over. But some Israeli peace activists should be taking the initiative to cross the borders with medications, in spite of the closure. The Israeli army can't allow settlers to come into the West Bank freely and prevent peace activists from coming in to support Palestinians and peace._

_There is where I think the responsibility lies on the peace activists. We need to be more active in these grass roots activities to try to give the Palestinians the impression that there are some people from the other side who are really worried. Even if it's a small number, at least there are some people who worry and who care and who want to help break the ice that has now frozen all these people-to-people activities on the Palestinian side, and maybe enable us to get back on the right track._

Palestinians peace activists have found themselves struggling within a maelstrom of internal and external turmoil, seeking viable ways to reconcile and express their allegiance to their society, their identification with the struggle against Israeli occupation and their belief in the viability and necessity for a return to some form of political not military solution.

**IV. LOGISTICS AS CONTEXT**

The current situation, in which the movement of Palestinians is so restricted and the ability to receive permits is becoming more difficult, obviously serves to inhibit People-to People and solidarity activities alike.

_It takes up a lot of time. Some organizations take on a full-time person just for that. And it's not only very difficult and time-consuming, but it's also amazingly frustrating._

Israeli organizations spend hours and days and weeks trying to obtain entry permits for Palestinian colleagues and interlocutors.
More and more, we're facing the reality that the only way for Palestinians to get out of the country is by going through Jordan, and there is a whole series of new problems now with regard to Jordan and with regard to internal movement within the West Bank and Gaza. These things impact the running of these programs. There isn't a lot we can do here at this moment, but these are the kinds of issues that from our experience in the past, when we have raised them as a collective, we have had some influence. I don't know that there's a lot to discuss, other than raising the problems and seeing what we can do about them. There is no relationship at all to the real security situation. The decisions are usually arbitrary. And we've found that a concerted effort with a lot of pressure coming from different directions can make this work.

This seemingly prosaic difficulty of facilitating interaction and plan meetings in solidarity and P2P activities alike, highlight the existential difficulty for activists and the imperative for more effective Israeli coordination and intervention on this issue.

In conclusion, we have observed that in both societies, P2P, in these past two years, rarely serves to ‘reach out’ to diverse populations not necessarily predisposed to peace camp views, rather largely serves as a ‘reach in’ mechanism to first and foremost, consolidate the respective peace camps. This ‘old-new’ task with its many streams of expression is confronted with a myriad of social and political obstacles, which have permeated the public consciousness of both societies. On both sides, activists and practitioners seek to successfully negotiate the inherent tension between appealing to their societies’ collective self-interest, struggling for legitimacy and “relevance internally and externally and their inherent need to forge meaningful cooperation with their partners on the ground.
Definitions and Objectives of People-to-People

Over the years, the “People-to-People” concept became a term used in an inclusive way to describe almost all kinds of activities that Israelis, Palestinians and foreigners undertook aimed at “helping” the peace process move forward. The term, People-to-People (P2P) is understood differently among those engaged in it which makes it difficult to classify in any definitive manner. However, some common themes may nevertheless be identified. Generally speaking, P2P denotes civil society cooperation; building constituencies for peace from the ground up; conflict resolution; learning the political narrative of the Other; bringing people into creative interaction; and learning from one-another and about each other’s culture.

In attempting to further deconstruct the term P2P, it might be judicious to examine who are those engaged in it, why they do so (i.e. overarching goals), what are its outputs and how are those outputs derived. In this way, we hoped to gain a more nuanced understanding of P2P may be gained. The insights and comments that appear below are those of P2P practitioners– Palestinians and Israelis alike – whose perspectives are informed by a rich and diverse experience with this type of work.

1. Typologies of People-to-People

One of the main difficulties in undertaking a process of reflection on these activities is in defining what they include. The definitions we adopted within the research are those taken from the participants in the research themselves: the NGO’s and the donors. We have noted the following kinds of activities described by people and organizations who were interviewed:

a) **Track II** activities mainly aimed at brainstorming on ideas for the formal agreements between the sides and for closing the gaps in positions between the two sides.

> All Track II activities are aimed at negotiation-level policy-makers. Some of these were pure Track II meetings of academics and policy advisors, and some were what we call Track 1.5, in which officials and non-officials were involved.

b) **Professional Meetings**– these aimed at bringing together professional people from the same area of expertise to discuss professional issues not directly related to the peace process or to peace making and building.
c) **Professional Training** – these activities, in general, aimed at technology transfer and the transfer of know-how, almost always from the Israeli side to the Palestinian side.

d) **Formal educational activities** – these activities took place in schools with teachers and students. They ranged from one-time activities to long-term multi-year efforts of creating peace education on both sides.

e) **Cultural activities** – these activities varied in populations participating and in their scope – some bringing people together to be exposed to the culture of the other side and sometimes to “create” together some form of cultural expression.

f) **Capacity building, institution building, service-provision** – these activities were aimed primarily at empowering the Palestinian side of the joint activity.

We want right to health, freedom of movement, etc. Also, we are there for the Palestinians and we should never forget that they’re occupied. Health and medical services are only one way to improve their life in our joint fight against the occupation. We know that we’re a drop in the sea. We can never exchange a public health system. We try to show how help can be done with respect, not as a favor, and also how much work we can do.

g) **Activities in the field of developing Environmental Cooperation**.
h) Activities defined as **Women's Issues and Shared Identity Issues.** These typically incorporate projects that address the distinctive needs of constituents on both sides with a shared identity. Activity focused around a shared identity that cross-cut the cleavage between Israelis and Palestinians can be a potent and resilient form of peace-building. Other forms of P2P organized around a shared identity include groups consisting of religious clergy members and even one group of bereaved parents from both sides.

i) **Grass-roots dialogue groups.** This is the type of P2P about which we have the least information.

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This is the essence of what it is I do. Activity bet. equals, in pain, in fear, in desperation and hope. We all share these. For me P2P is grassroots – people to grassroots people. Human beings to human beings. In this context I find complete parity between the sides.
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j) **Political Struggle, Solidarity groups and Advocacy groups.** These are groups whose objectives in this field are the expressions of sympathy, empathy, and advocacy on the part of one group for the other. This type of P2P may or may not take the form of the provision of goods or services, but rather, symbolic demonstrations of support or political protest. What distinguishes this category from the others is that is does not always necessitate interface between the two peoples.

2. Objectives of People-to-People

In identifying the objectives of People-to-People, there seemed to be much agreement among its practitioners. Many of those interviewed in the course of this research expected that P2P would help realize a political aim by building support/constituencies for peace by bringing members from both sides together in a structured, or relatively structured, manner. In this way, support for peace (and the peace process) among those not traditionally affiliated with the respective peace camps would be cultivated. An Israeli veteran stated:

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We had a clear goal: to move, together with our communities, towards a negotiated political solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict acceptable to and respected by both sides, with a minimum of violence, death and aggression. I remember our Palestinian colleagues setting this as a community priority, working together as private citizens with considerable creativity, with different strategies and new techniques, including dialogue and P2P activities.
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With the purpose of creating a civil-society based process to accompany the political one, various strategies were identified and implemented which would generally enable these two populations not previously in contact, to create a situation that would make real peace possible. The strategies and techniques most frequently discussed in the course of this study included civil-society building, education, public-diplomacy, and dialogue. The range in typologies reveals itself in the varying strategies and techniques.

_P2P is essentially a non-political educational task which involves all those who are involved in education between people—not just in schools. It should be a very broad thing. The idea is to bring people together to learn about the other._

_Civil society initiatives are the vehicle which can help move the sides along this path. Often the divide between NGO community and political echelon is somewhat blurred. In my experience, there is almost no such thing as pure NGOs. Nonetheless there is a focus of civil society organizations that differs from the public sector/government of course, even if the lines between them are blurred. I agree that a peace process cannot begin with history, even though eventually history has to be reckoned with. The ability to do so is something civil society organizations can promote more effectively than government organizations._

_Dialoguing per se of individuals is important and interesting but not what I’d call the essence of P2P. The fundamental focus must be to bring the civil society of each society into creative interaction. If this process is to parallel the political peace process and to undergird it, links must be forged not only among individuals but institutions and organizations as well, i.e. women’s organization based on common women’s issues etc. These groups with a common focus can more easily find a modus vivendi. You move from enemy to neighbor, and from neighbor to partner (share concerns interests), and from partners to friends._

Some practitioners focus more on the organizational and NGO levels, while others, on the more individual or group levels.
All participants seemed to agree that their role lies in the facilitation of a process whereby cooperation and dialogue can occur—whether it be between individuals, groups, or organizations.

3. Rethinking and Refining the Term P2P

At one point, the English term P2P seemed to have been a useful one because of the multiplicity of meanings contained therein (not the case in either Hebrew or Arabic). It refers at the same time to encounters between both individuals and collectives. In this sense, it allowed for a constructive ambiguity. However, according to the responses of those interviewed, the ambiguity of the term is perhaps attributable to the ambiguity in understanding which surrounds the issue. Indeed, it seems that the current situation is calling for a tightening of the P2P belt. The despair and disappointment that have followed the years of hope and flourishing of P2P activities seem to have rendered any terminology related to those years as tired at best.

Furthermore, the operational differences in understanding the meaning of the term P2P have come to be more than just semantics. The ambiguity of the operational term, and the subjective manner in which participants’ and professionals’ perceive it represents a serious issue that is perhaps a hindrance to the success of further action in the field.
The term “people-to-people” has become problematic for various other reasons. For one, it no longer resonates among their Palestinian counterparts, to put it mildly. Among Palestinians, the term has become tantamount to “collaboration” or “normalization” - even more so now than in the past and the term “dialogue” seems to be more acceptable among than P2P. According to one respondent, “the term P2P is at best met with a shrug of the shoulders and worse, perceived as a total failure...” The word ‘peace’ either in Israel or Palestine is not used; more relevant terms are justice, equality, and ceasefire. Israeli NGOs, for their part, also exhibit ambivalence with respect to the term “P2P”. Similarly, the term “co-existence”, referring to activity bringing together Jewish and Palestinian Israeli citizens, also appears to have become contested.

It has been suggested that P2P is too closely linked with the post-Oslo euphoria which is now characterized by an era of fear and mistrust. The ambiguity of the term may account for a lack of trust by the public in the process and its progenitors as well as a lack of direction for its professionals.

During IPCRI’s conference in Antalya we discussed the possibilities of changing the terminology to suggest something a bit more definitive.
The following are excerpts from that discussion:

a. Peace-Building Activities:

So it was suggested that we begin to call these activities something else, namely, peace-building activities. That's actually what we're trying to do. P2P has acquired a bad connotation for lots of reasons... [so] maybe we can come up with some new generic name that more directly addresses what we are really talking about, which is building peace between the communities.

b. War-to-Peace Programs:

I think “peace-building” has already been over-utilized. Maybe we can come up with something new that justifies replacing the old -- war-to-peace programs, for instance. This is something different that has not been used before and that would fit in with what we want to achieve, and it includes the concept of peace-building without using the same words. We are moving from war to peace, and this is the work that must be done in that process.

c. Dialogue and Development:

A colleague and I were thinking about an idea for a new term to replace people-to-people a colleague wrote it down in English, and we were thinking of Hebrew and Arabic Translation, She said "D and D", Dialogue and Development".

4. Conclusion:

In attempting to define the term, People-to-People, it becomes apparent that this is an almost impossible endeavor. For one thing, the term has meant very different things to the different players. Another issue is that people-to-people programs have expanded in ways that were not a part of the original conceptualization of the term, though it can be said that it is to the credit of the movement that it has adapted to needs as they have emerged, as is the case of the solidarity group, Ta’ayoush.

Furthermore, the breadth and ambiguity of the term have created problems of perception for those involved in the work of P2P as well as the general public; Over the course of the past few difficult years the term P2P has acquired negative connotations. That said, there is reluctance on the part of the various practitioners to be too hasty in abandoning the original term and it is perhaps to the credit of the breadth of the term that it is inclusive of so many different interpretations of the work.
CRITERIA FOR MEASURING SUCCESS AND OTHER RELATED COMMENTS:

How do you define success?

In discussing criteria for measuring success it is helpful to separate between product-oriented P2P projects and the more classic types of projects that are primarily geared towards pure dialogue. Product-oriented projects refer to non-tangible products which can include formal and informal educational tools (such as tools for non-violent communication) as well as professional cooperation and track II whose final product is the creation of agreements between governments. It seems that the latter relies less on the reality on the ground than the former. Therefore for the purpose of this section we shall differentiate between product-oriented P2P and classic P2P.

Participants who engage in more classic forms of P2P draw most heavily from the concept of contact-theory, which holds that pure contact between two peoples in itself contains the possibility for conflict transformation. Participants of this category almost unanimously agreed that there is no uniform approach to measuring the success of a project which is so elusive in nature.

If I manage to have only two people meet, even this is fine with me. I’m in no hurry. I have absolutely no criteria for success. Obviously, I’m happy if people after an activity maintain contact, but if not, I’m still satisfied. I know I do my best and relate to all this rather fatalistically, “whatever I do is OK”. If I had rigid criteria like this, perhaps I wouldn’t undertake this activity in the 1st place.

It is such a slow process. People always asked me, “if you take 10 people to Gaza or 40, will this actually make the difference?”. My response always is, “yes, every little bit makes a difference”. This isn’t criticism, its just a very slow process.

For participants in this category, the attempt at impact is not measurable but its effects may be greater than anticipated, which is one of their motivations for doing this work; that is, participants in this category are motivated by the knowledge that in the absence of any of this kind of work, things could be much worse.
While the effects of classic P2P may not be measurable, there remain several measurable factors, which relate directly to the stated objectives in the onset of planning any kind of activity:

For a particular project:

Did participants learn anything positive about the other side? Are participants more aware of the problems and fears of the other side?

Did they get a personal stake in the success of the peace process?

Are they going to return for more dialogue? Are they willing and committed to enlisting others in dialog activities?

Are they willing to speak out for peace and coexistence in their societies?

When confronted with the realities and social pressures of war, does their commitment withstand the test? Were they honest with each other?

Did organizational coordination work smoothly?

Still, many P2P actors stated that one measure of success is simply expressed in the willingness of its participants (targets) to return:
1) The number of people actively involved in the more nuts and bolts of working together;
2) Length of time that the activity takes place;
3) Organizational commitment to the activity (usually we work with other organizations);
4) Desire/willingness of participants to come back for a second round.

- Projects that serve interests of both sides, have a product:

On the other side of the spectrum are the ‘product-oriented’ P2P projects. It is much more possible to measure success when there is some sort of product and more specific objectives.

Three suggested criteria for judging the success of these activities are:

1) To what extent did this activity create/generate new ideas? Get Beyond slogans?
2) To what extent did it impact on the official process?
3) (less importantly) To what extent was there continuation of these working groups i.e. was it a one-off meeting or part of a series.

- Projects that have clear objectives and which yield some sort of tangible results (even in the social sciences) are easier to follow-up on.

One test is whether or not you create a framework for the P2P interaction which itself is productive. [Another test is] do you get some effective results? Follow up from the projects you run? In projects involving the hard sciences, this is easier (e.g. eye diseases). In the areas of social, educational and leadership development, it is a bit more difficult. How is what you got from the course able to be translated into action upon returning home? For example, the existence of small businesses a year or so after a course on this for women, this is a success. If people begin to expand the work of youth movements or preserving parks wildlife in Gaza, this too is a success.

Thirdly, what kind of relations develop between you and the organizational partners with which you are working? Do you talk on other levels, invited back and forth (to what extent does this exist?) A fourth, is whether or not the PNA noticed you and is concerned with your activities. If they express an interest in talking with you, (because they think it is important), this too maybe considered success. This is an example of impact upon the political process. Fundraising is also an indication of success to some extent. We have always thought that being able to link with Intl. orgs (UN) is important for P2P.
• Different criteria for turbulent times—mere survival is determining.

In times of crisis, specifically post September 2000, the criteria shifted for participants. Here the key is mere survival of projects in the face of dwindling participation, willingness, and external support. The above categorical distinctions need not apply in this case.

The NGO operational definition of success is, X people came, everyone said it was "meaningful" etc. But in the context of coexistence it is meaningless if the next week one of the participants is guarding a Settlement, another is making Qassam rockets, a third is shot by Israeli police and a fourth is recruiting people for the Intifada and so on, then what was the success? The "success" will only be judged in that sense in 5 years or 10 years.

Generally speaking, the goals don’t change. The difference is that the expectations are a bit lower. The question of taking responsibility would be a question I would ask myself after each group of participants. Now, I ask how many listened, shared, reached a point of empathy w/the other, reached a point of critical self-observation? If they went home with questions, then I’m fine.

In regular times, [I’d define it as] a research project that is conducted, completed, and yields interesting helpful findings, allowing for the dissemination of findings in standard academic channels. This is a good project, good research. It promotes proactive practice in the field as well as expands knowledge. In turbulent times however, just continuing the project, even at the expense of other previous goals, is itself a success. This demonstrates that you don’t succumb to the difficult conditions prevailing. We hope of course to be able to return to the previous period. Another criterion [for success] is to be able to succeed, through the research, to create a feeling of balance between Israelis and Palestinians that allows for the latter to conduct research on a level comparable to that of Israel. We must be very careful and mindful about creating this parity, free of paternalism and respecting the sensibilities of the other etc. An example of this is how exactly we write together?
Many participants stated that in times of crisis a successful project is one that serves the needs of the Palestinian side:

I usually say, “my experience is, in peace time let alone in war time, the projects that are successful are those that serve the interests of both sides—especially the Palestinian side. There is, a product for them, and part of the product is useful to them. 2 parts: infrastructure and development of human resources. Not always you have this infrastructure. Product and/or infrastructure.” That’s true for peace time and even more in war time. The Palestinians need a real interest in cooperation. Most of my projects had a product or an infrastructure as an objective beforehand. I can’t say that we tried many things and came to this conclusion. It was a-priori. I was not responsible for dialogues, my colleague was, but our projects are alive even in times of stress. It’s slower and more difficult in war time, but still going. Mostly slower, but there are more “kevetches” and such. I am quite limited in ‘my’ counterparts. When there is a product, they are less likely to stop when they’re angry at the Palestinians. Even though they’re in conflict, what they do is good for both sides. It serves Israeli interest that Palestinians have better agriculture, education, etc. We didn’t have a problem neither with Israelis nor with Palestinians.

We want to examine what kind of ongoing relationship develops between participants. The quantitative criterion changes according to the era.

The essential question is to what we can aspire?

1) **Trust** – a subjective feeling of equality amongst the partners of the project – not an artificial equality, rather one where each partner feels an ownership and responsibility—certainly amongst the project leaders.

2) **Answering participant’s needs** - What needs does the project address, what fundamental need, not just “peace” – this approach characterizes our organization, where we understand that teachers need, for example, teacher materials. (They have other needs as well). If I can identify the needs and address them, the cooperation will be forthcoming.

3) **Ability to deal with unplanned issues** – it’s possible to raise issues that aren’t a part of the formal agenda.

4) **Ability to learn from crises** – how we deal with them, as an opportunity to draw lessons and progress as a result of the crisis.
Measuring Impact: A Complex Endeavor

The issue of impact is an extremely elusive one, analytically speaking. Indeed, the term connotes many different things to different people. From an operational perspective, the question is begged “how does one measure impact?” In this study, we are able to gauge the subjective perceptions of those practitioners engaged in P2P with respect to the perceived impact on their respective societies. This however, is a far cry from systematically measuring impact based on agreed upon operationalized indices thereof. Hence, it must be stated from the outset that the notion of “impact” guiding this inquiry is field-driven, i.e. informed by the wealth of experience garnered by various practitioners. As one practitioner noted:

The people interviewed are not the actual stakeholders. They are supervisors, monitors, administrators, etc. Had a representative sample of students, teachers or whoever else took part in these projects, been interviewed through focus groups, it's very likely different responses would have been received.

It is important to clarify that impact clearly takes many forms, and therefore any attempt to gauge it must take into account its varied nature. Additionally, with regard to assessing impact, we see that measuring impact depends on the context, and that different kinds of P2P also have different kinds of impact. For example, capacity-building projects have a different kind of impact. There are different sets of outputs that can be measured or assessed in different ways. And just as capacity building P2P requires a distinct yardstick for measuring impact, so too do P2P projects featuring professional cooperation. According to one practitioner involved in this P2P sub-sector,

We know that health elites are highly respected in both societies, and they are also agents of change. If I work with [names of prominent Palestinian health professionals], there is a trickle-down effect throughout their organizations. If I visit an office in Beit Hanina and people see me entering, they know it's okay with the leadership, and so the effect spreads. We have seen that when we work with the elite; it has this ripple effect.

It appears that in the case of professional cooperation in particular, the potential to increase the level of impact on non-professionals may grow exponentially from the example set by the professionals.

In discussing criteria for measuring impact or “success”, it is helpful to separate between product-oriented P2P projects and the more classic types of projects that are primarily geared towards pure dialogue. Again, product-oriented projects include non-tangible products which can include formal and informal educational tools (such as tools for non-violent communication) as well as professional cooperation and track
II whose product is the creation of agreements between governments. It seems that the latter relies less on the reality on the ground than the former. Therefore for the purpose of this section we shall differentiate between product-oriented P2P and classic P2P.

Participants who engage in more classic forms of P2P draw most heavily from the concept of contact-theory, which holds that pure contact between two peoples in itself contains the possibility for conflict transformation. Participants of this category almost unanimously agreed that there is no uniform approach to measuring the success of a project which is so elusive in nature. It was suggested that for these types of projects, the following questions must be asked when seeking to assess impact:

Did participants learn anything positive about the other side?
Are participants more aware of the problems and fears of the other side?
Did they get a personal stake in the success of the peace process?
Are they going to return for more dialogue?
Are they willing and committed to enlisting others in dialog activities?
Are they willing to speak out for peace and coexistence in their societies?
When confronted with the realities and social pressures of war, does their commitment withstand the test?
Were they honest with each other?
Did organizational coordination work smoothly?

A number of those interviewed claimed that one plausible measure of the success of a given project is simply the willingness of its participants (targets) to return. Other factors to examine include:
1) The number of people actively involved in the more nuts and bolts of working together;
2) Length of time that the activity takes place;
3) Organizational commitment to the activity;
4) Desire/willingness of participants to come back for a second round.

On the other side of the spectrum are the ‘product-oriented’ P2P projects. Here, the mutual benefit to both sides is generally cited as critical to the perceived success of the project.

My experience is, in peacetime let alone in wartime, the projects that are successful are those that serve the interests of both sides—especially the Palestinian side. They need a real interest in cooperation... But, it’s true also on the Israeli side. When there is a product, they are less likely to stop when they’re angry at the Palestinians. Even though they’re in conflict, what they do is good for both sides. It serves the Israeli interest that Palestinians have better agriculture, education, etc.
The notion of success or impact is generally more amenable to measurement when the project features some sort of product and/or more tangible objectives. These were expressed, albeit with different emphases, in three different substantive areas.

**Track II Work**

*Our three criteria for judging the success of these activities are:*

*To what extent did this activity create/generate new ideas? Get Beyond slogans? To what extent did it impact on the official process? To what extent was there continuation of these working groups i.e. was it a one-off meeting or a series of let’s say ten meetings.*

**Education**

*Success would be that our participants in our projects, I refer to educators and students, acquire a language. By saying a language I mean the use of the values that we’ve been working on like equality, freedom to/from, social involvement, etc. have expanded the language. I don’t only mean the language, but the internalization of the values. Secondly, implications vis a vis behavior, critical self-observation of the change. Thirdly, behavior changes broadly speaking—and this is almost a dream. Taking steps, taking place in activities, being active. I wouldn’t say these are educational criteria. My goal is social change for a just society, equal, and so on.*

**Science/Research**

*One test is whether or not you create a framework for the P2P interaction which itself is productive. These courses were successful in this respect. [Another test is] do you get some effective results? Follow up from the projects you run? In projects involving the hard sciences, this is easier (e.g. eye diseases). In the areas of social, educational and leadership development, it is a bit more difficult. How is what you got from the course able to be translated into action upon returning home? For example, the existence of small businesses a year or so after a course on this for women, this is a success. If people begin to expand the work of youth movements or preserving parks wildlife in Gaza, this too is a success.*

What is important to note however, is that the indices of success in projects embodying a highly product-oriented focus are not always exclusively limited to product-oriented measures of success. As one interviewee involved in joint academic research notes:
Another criterion is to be able to succeed, through the research, to create a feeling of balance between Israelis and Palestinians that allows for the latter to conduct research on a level comparable to that of Israel. We must be very careful and mindful about creating this parity, free of paternalism and respecting the sensibilities of the other etc. An example of this is how exactly we write together?

This is echoed in the remarks of another engaged in educational P2P:

Answering participants’ needs - what needs does the project address, what fundamental need, not just “peace” – this approach characterizes [name of NGO], where we understand that teachers need, for example, teacher materials. Trust – a subjective feeling of equality amongst the partners of the project – not an artificial equality, rather one where each partner feels an ownership and responsibility - certainly amongst the project leaders.

**Times of (Relative) Peace and Times of Violent Conflict**

It should be quite obvious that there is no uniform method or criteria for evaluating impact, for what constitutes success cannot usually be reduced to numbers. It is result of many factors such as the time period in question.

During some periods like now, even just having people come together may, in itself, be considered a success, while during other periods, if no sustained cooperative activity takes place, this might be considered a failure. Obviously one need some kind of parameters (i.e. have the desired objectives been met, and if not, have alternative ones been achieved?). But sometimes the process itself is more important than the output. One example is the bringing together of journalists from both sides for the purpose of putting out a joint newspaper. Sometimes the positive dynamic that can develop between those involved is more important in the long run than having met the objective of actually coming out with the newspaper.

In regular times, [I’d define it as] a research project that is conducted, completed, and yields interesting helpful findings, allowing for the dissemination of findings in standard academic channels. This is a good project, good research. It promotes proactive practice in the field as well as expands knowledge. In turbulent times however, just continuing the project, even at the expense of other previous goals, is itself a success. This demonstrates that you don’t succumb to the difficult conditions prevailing.

Another interviewee took a slightly different tack in addressing the issue of the particular time period in question.
Differing Levels of Analyzing Impact/Success
For the purposes of our analysis, the perceived impact of P2P over the past few years, in all its many expressions, may be conceptualized at three distinct levels. The first is on the level of the formal peace process. The second is the impact on public opinion/attitudes at large on both sides, and the third relates to the qualitative, potentially transformational effects of P2P on the individuals who take part therein.

A. First Level – The Peace Process
The question addressed here, crudely put, is whether peace-building affected peacemaking. Put slightly differently, we are interested in examining here the degree to which the work of P2P may have been brought to bear on the decisions or discussions by the key decision makers in the conflict, i.e. primarily political or military leaders. This form of impact then, addresses the influence of peace-building efforts on the formal peace process. It is roundly accepted, among those interviewed in this study, that P2P, with a few exceptions, did not impact the formal peace process. This would seem rather ironic when we consider that the Oslo agreements were made possible through the efforts of a number of individuals engaged in P2P (Track II). In this sense, P2P may be likened to someone who successfully fathers a child, but is effectively excluded from the process of his/her nurturing and rearing. Most of those interviewed hastened to point out that P2P in fact never purported to affect direct change at this level, but rather to merely reinforce it.

One respondent commented, we're assessing the situation we're living in now and saying, 'here we have all these organizations; hundreds and thousands of people have participated in people-to-people peace-building activities. So how the hell did we get where we are?' There's an assumption built into this statement that, to some extent, we bear at least partial responsibility for the current situation. But I tend to pose the opposite question. Imagine how much worse the situation would be if we didn't do everything we did. These things are impossible to measure, but subjectively, from many of the people we interviewed and talked to, and those sitting in this room, there's a sense amongst ourselves that we haven't met our goals. We didn't have the impact we wanted. I think everybody agrees.
Another veteran P2P practitioner went even further, arguing that:

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\text{it is mere romanticism to think that a group of high-minded individuals, with a minimum of financial and governmental backing, can be an effective partner to or [a] catalyst [for] any peace agreement... in the present violent reality, it would be hubris in the extreme to think that the same small groups of Israelis and Palestinians, a few 1000 at most on either side, are sufficient and acceptable leadership to bring about or sustain change. Yet another was particularly scathing in his critique of P2P suggesting that, the acid test [of P2P] was the Intifada. The murder of a ‘Seeds of Peace’ activist by Israeli police was a telling symbol of the total and utter futility and bankruptcy of P2P projects”. But a fourth took a more cautious approach, claiming that, political realities were stronger than we were. Humility is therefore in order.}
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There were, here and there, a few dissenting views to the otherwise prevailing opinion that P2P did not impact the level of peacemaking. One Palestinian respondent for example did identify (albeit tentatively) some impact at this level:

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\text{My own gut feeling tells me that there has been an impact but this is obviously very hard to gauge, [yet] there is no doubt that all this activity has definitely impacted the Palestinian leadership.}
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Anecdotal evidence of the effects of P2P on the Palestinian leadership is provided by the representative of one Israeli NGO engaged in development work:

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\text{When [our activities] took place in Palestine, they were usually very well attended, and–but even some reporting in the Palestinian media. Considering their status as being ‘in struggle’, I think the [Palestinian] leadership was more aware of P2P than their Israeli counterparts. Another Israeli interviewee also argues, I can pinpoint evidence of where we had a specific impact on the peace process, in the agreements, in the negotiations and so on”. With that, he conceded that, “we are nonetheless in a much worse situation now than when we started.}
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When assessing the potential impact of P2P on the peacemaking level, a certain expectation of P2P emerges, according to which the recent crisis demonstrates the total dependence of peace building efforts on the vagaries of the formal peace process. As such, the ability of P2P to affect or condition those events is all but negligible. P2P is therefore perhaps more a reflection of external events than a reframer of them. Ultimately, the role of P2P during a crisis in the formal peace process may best be understood as \textit{keeping our finger in the dam}, as one respondent suggested:

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\text{Our role was to preserve some basic human contact. Until Oct. 2000, we were gradually reaching more people through dialogue, getting to know ‘the other’ etc. After Oct. 2000, our role was to prevent this wave of violence from washing away everything.}
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B. Second Level – Public Opinion/Attitudes

The second level we address is the impact of P2P on public opinion/attitudes at large on both sides. As was the case with the perceived level of impact at the first level, here too most of the interviewees concluded that P2P work had little effect on public opinion. This was underscored by the remarks of two Israeli interviewees. The first noted that:

*Based on the response of those I meet here in Israel on the street, very few know about what goes on. They’re totally unaware. At the same time, they often are interested and almost encouraged to hear that there is another side to the story. I think this can only be conveyed on a one-to-one basis, not through the mass media. Another was more scathing in his critique of the limited visibility of P2P: What [P2P] there is, is confined to a precious few people, and studiously ignored by both Arab and Israeli media. In Palestine and Arab countries, the situation is immeasurably worse.*

One practitioner offered a different interpretation:

*People know much more than we think they do. They read about it in the newspapers, see TV programs and listen to the radio. They also have friends who are involved. My belief is that, if we were to conduct such a survey on both sides, I would estimate that maybe ten percent of the Israeli population, or even more, has been exposed to the people-to-people concept.*

While Israeli interviewees tended to bemoan the lack of interest on the part of the media in the face of efforts of P2P practitioners to publicize their efforts, some Palestinians pointed to a reverse tendency. Accordingly, a number of initiators of P2P on the Palestinian side actively eschewed the media. As one respondent observed:

*We are influencing neither the people nor the top decision-makers for the simple reason that we hide our work. We are not allowing it to become known and to spread. Another called for a more public approach to peace-building: I am fully convinced that we need a public diplomacy. We shouldn't hide these things from the public. We have to educate the public and raise their awareness. Enough with secret channels and all these [clandestine] methods.*

Underlying the analysis of impact at this level is a decidedly ambivalent view of the media and its putative role in this process. The mass media, not surprisingly, are viewed as the primary vehicle though which P2P may engender impact at this level. The experience of P2P practitioners underscored the utility of the media in disseminating the work and alternately in undermining it as well. These of course apply to those same instances in which it was possible to generate interest on the part
of the media. In more instances however, respondents pointed to the lack of interest that more often characterized much of the mass media.

Any attempt to gauge the effects of social interventions such as P2P on public opinion steers one in the direction of survey and or evaluation research that is almost invariably quantitative in nature. This in turn presents a host of problems, some of which were identified by those interviewed. One problem encountered when approaching the issue of impact from a purely quantitative perspective is the choice of the appropriate unit of analysis, i.e. exactly who is it that we consider have been impacted by P2P. Is the locus of impact only those who formally take part in P2P activity? What about secondary or ripple effects of such activity on those who were not participants themselves but who may be affected by those who were? One Israeli practitioner illustrates this problematic:

What many interviewees referred to as the “numbers game” is clearly the bane of many of those engaged in P2P. Funders typically require some form of quantitative evaluation of activity and this in turn forces practitioners to focus energy on quantity – sometimes at the expense of quality. Indeed, the distinction between quantity and quality brings us to the next level of analyzing impact, namely the qualitative long-term effects that P2P engenders for those individuals taking part.

C. Qualitative Effects of P2P on Individuals

Many of those interviewed took pains to stress the undeniably gradual nature of this work. According to one Israeli:

For participants at this analytical level of impact assessment, “success” is not easily measurable but its effects may be greater than anticipated, which is one of the
motivations for doing this work, i.e. participants at this level are motivated by the knowledge that in the absence of any of this kind of work, things could be much worse.

The distinction between a focus on quantity vs. that of quality is aptly illustrated by the example provided by one Israeli interviewee:

Asking how many people were willing to sit in a room and speak to Palestinians -- that's one kind of impact. Another kind is asking how many people began to view the checkpoints as problematic, following these meetings. This is echoed in the remarks of another respondent, engaged in development P2P: While the breadth of impact was very limited, the depth [for those involved] was very significant in terms of attitude change etc.

These examples (and many others that were reported) underscore the potentially transformative nature of P2P on the micro level of individual participation. What many noted however was that the piecemeal change that is effected at this level of P2P intervention rarely is of interest to those bodies that fund P2P. The latter are generally drawn to activities that feature large numbers of participants and offer
some opportunity for a larger visibility. These of course are all but absent from the kinds of P2P activity that afford this third type of impact.

**Short-term vs. Long-term Impact**

Related to the distinction between quantitative measures of impact involving large numbers of participants and a more qualitative impact is the distinction between short-term and long-term impact. Just as funders tend to prefer P2P projects that feature large numbers of participants, so too do they tend towards projects that are short-term in duration (consisting of one to three encounters between particular groups). The advantages of short-term projects are rather clear (much easier to implement, the feedback is more immediate and often more dramatic, etc.) which might explain this orientation on the part of the funders. However, this type of P2P is not without its shortcomings. As illustrated by one Israeli evaluation researcher:

> In a qualitative and quantitative evaluation of a youth peace education project I did in 1998-1999, I found amazing effects - amazing [positive] attitude changes, all scientifically significant… But when these populations [were surveyed] two years later, (even before the second Intifada), it was found that the situation managed to undo all the [positive] impact of the project. This was a short-term project, and that's where the money usually goes.

Thus, just as projects themselves maybe conceived of as short or long-term, so too may be the strategies employed in assessing impact.

**Differential Nature of Impact (based on national distinction)**

The operationalizing of impact, in order to be able to then measure it, is rendered difficult due to the need to analyze it at different levels. Its being perceived differently across the conflict divide, i.e. conceived of differently by Palestinians and Israelis respectively, further compounds this difficulty.

One critical parameter, along which the impact of P2P is often measured, is that of the interface with the governing elites. In the case of the Israelis, there is recognition that the governing elite (even when associated with the left and ostensibly positively predisposed to pursuing a peace process) attribute little significance to the work of peace building NGOs. At the same time, and perhaps as a result of this, the posture of successive Israeli governments towards NGOs engaged in P2P has been essentially one of laissez faire (some might claim “benign neglect”). This is expressed in the remarks of one practitioner involved in P2P of an academic nature:
On the Palestinian side by contrast, for P2P to be perceived of as having impact, it usually must enjoy the legitimacy conferred upon it by the Palestinian governing elite (i.e. the PNA). Experience from the educational arena has demonstrated that:

**If the Palestinian Ministry of Education is opposed to these peace activities in the education system, it can freeze us out and [jeopardize the livelihoods of] those headmasters and teachers who participate.**

The imperative of Palestinian government sanction of P2P may be understood as a top-down form of legitimacy. But an opposite trend among the Palestinians was also identified. According to this notion, for impact to be felt (or perceived to have been felt), the very real tangible needs of local Palestinian communities must be met. One Palestinian practitioner illustrated this point.

**The [Palestinian] politicians respond to constituencies. If a constituency sees P2P as problematic, then the politicians automatically respond to any P2P program as problematic. My experience is that Palestinian communities have not seen enough benefit from P2P in order to motivate them to [pressure] politicians and say to them, ‘Hey, why are you stopping these things? They are working for my community’. The comments of another Palestinian, a health practitioner, provide further evidence of this notion: The issue on the Palestinian side remains that the community has not been impacted by collaborative work, and therefore, they don't really care. And the leadership doesn't care because the constituency is indifferent. We are not going to be able to market anything through the media unless we really have results to show... My recommendation is that, if we can impact the community so it can see that health is improving, education is improving, Women's status is improving [through P2P activities], then the community will pressure their politicians.**

One mode of P2P that is particularly pertinent with respect to generating a perceived benefit, and thereby achieving popular legitimacy, is what has been referred to in recent years as “relief”, “solidarity” or “humanitarian” work. These refer to the provision by Israelis to Palestinians of basic commodities made scarce or unavailable in recent months due to the escalated conflict. Relief/solidarity work is deemed essential by many on both sides in generating a perceived benefit on the Palestinians side and the requisite impact. Yet at the same time, it is important to recognize that
this kind of cooperative work, as essential as it may be in the present context, paradoxically runs the risk of reproducing the very asymmetrical power relations between the sides that P2P seeks to rectify. In this sense, P2P of the relief/solidarity variety may serve to perpetuate the status quo.

The importance of a perceived benefit to be derived by Palestinians from P2P is heightened when we consider that Palestinians who are visibly associated with P2P are branded by some as ‘collaborators’ or those who are awarding Israelis with the normalization so sought after by the latter. As one Israeli put it:

*I'm not sure that all the Israelis involved in [P2P] understand the very difficult personal price and dilemmas that Palestinian partners must endure.*

Earlier, we discussed the role of the media in facilitating a wider impact for P2P activity undertaken. But here too, Israelis and Palestinians may take very different views of the role played by the mass media. If the role of the media in general is conceptualized as portraying to the targeted audiences messages that are consistent with the overarching national, religious or cultural narrative, then it clearly has differential effects for Israelis and Palestinians. As one Israeli practitioner noted that when the media actually does bother broadcasting something about P2P:

*They just perpetuate things. People [in Israel] just say, ‘Okay, so now the left-wing pro-Palestinians have taken over the media’ - and that's already been said enough times. However, if you show these same stories on television on the Palestinian side... all they'll say is, ‘Okay. Now we know who the bad people are, who the collaborators are’.*

Given this nuanced understanding of how “impact” is perceived very differently by Israelis and Palestinians, we are able to shed light on some of the ways through which impact is facilitated, such as the role of the media and gain a deeper appreciation of the complexity of this work.

Beyond the matter of perceived benefits derived by communities on both sides (be these material, symbolic or both), there is also the issue of the legitimacy enjoyed by P2P practitioners in the eyes of those populations on their own side of the national divide they seek to engage. An Israeli explains that some kind of identification with and empathy for the targeted community must be manifest in order for impact to be able to take root. She claims:

*You can't come to a religious community or a lower socio-economic community [in Israel] and say you want them to listen to you when you don't show any kind of understanding for them. I'm sure that my volunteer activity on behalf of Russian immigrants or the legitimacy (derived from my family background) that I possess within in religious circles, help explain the effect I have had in working with these communities.*
Summary

Interestingly, despite the assessment of many in the field that impact on both sides has been minimal, virtually no one advocated “closing up shop”. Indeed, there was unmistakable evidence of a general willingness to continue or resume P2P. One respondent argued that this is essential, if only because the existence of such work creates hope in a time of extreme despair and polarization.

And so, while definitive quantifiable indicators of impact are not widely in evidence from the past years of P2P experience, those involved in its planning and implementation clearly remain determined to pursue this course of action. Rather than motivations based on proven impact, theirs seem to be based on both their personal experiences in witnessing impact and on an innate faith that such activity will eventually achieve at least some of its (admittedly lofty) goals. They also seem driven by an intuitive and/or anecdotally informed conviction that such activity has made at least a modest contribution to peace efforts – if not in buttressing a beleaguered peace process, then at least in keeping open some lines of communication between parties that were transformed almost overnight from partners in a peace process to erstwhile enemies in a seemingly timeless violent conflict. The persistent continuation of their P2P activities bears witness to their conviction that the efficacy of their work is real and essential. There is evidence of a real increase in activity in this field since mid 2002 and a belief that the desire for re-engagement on both sides in fact indicates a potential shift influencing public opinion from the "bottom-up".
P2P Strategies

It has long been asked whether P2P professionals and activists possess or are even capable of possessing a comprehensive strategy or strategies in their pursuit of P2P projects. This question has preoccupied those in the field for some time now – activists, funders and observers alike. The conventional wisdom as expressed in many of our interviews is that there has been a chronic lack of a formal, comprehensive and coordinated strategy for P2P, pre and post October 2000. This section will lay out the contours and make an initial effort to “deconstruct” the difficulties within the field in understanding, agreeing and acting upon this notion, as expressed through our interviews.

There are a number of distinctions in order. Firstly the distinction (and organic link) between the notions of coordination and strategy are key to such an understanding. Activists agreed that there is a lack of systematic coordination both within and between the three major circles of: 1) 1st and 2nd track players; 2) P2P and peace activists and 3) Funders, and that such coordination is a core prerequisite for forging even skeletal strategic frameworks of action.

Another clear distinction surrounds the time differential of pre and post October 2000 activity. In pre October 2000, despite the diversity of opinion and approaches to their activity, P2P activists and practitioners the overarching aim of P2P could be retroactively understood to strengthen and deepen the legitimacy for the peace process in both societies, through whatever means. It is unclear though whether that notion or Oslo architect, Dr. Yair Hirshfeld’s view presented below served as a rallying and unifying point of departure for the diverse field.

<table>
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<th>Israeli-Palestinian People to People strategy had three clear objectives: first, to prepare the ground for the signing of an Israeli-Palestinian permanent status deal; second, to create the necessary conditions for a sustainable peace; and third, to pave the way toward the consolidation of peace (Hirshfeld SJS Journal #43:3).</th>
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An additional to point to common features of various P2P forms and the general similarity of purpose is expressed in another activist’s reflection.

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<th>We had a clear goal: to move, together with our communities, towards a negotiated political solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict acceptable to and respected by both sides, with a minimum of violence, death and aggression. I remember our Palestinian colleagues setting this as a community priority, working together as private citizens with considerable creativity, with different strategies and new techniques, including dialogue and P2P activities.</th>
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The volatile nature of the post October 2000 prompted one veteran activist to assert:

“it’s hard to have a strategy when times are so difficult and we don’t know what is flying. To get to understand one another better is a basis for the future.”

This quip reflects an unapologetic polar position that in times of crisis and violence all efforts to keep the ‘boat afloat’ should be appreciated in light of the stormy context and that the notion of coordinated strategy is perhaps more of a cerebral and academic exercise and is in fact untenable.

Retrospectively, there was a self-criticism extant that a formal, coordinated and comprehensive strategy for P2P could have impacted the present situation more effectively. One participant asserted that the absence of a deliberate strategy accounted for the lack of any type of direct movement, the absence of which paved the way for the insurgence of extremists.

There wasn’t enough strategic thinking, but rather a continuation of ad hoc, sporadically funded activity, with little linkage either to governmental bodies above or large portions of the public below. Planning was left to the imagination of the various organizations, goals were short term with little prioritizing. At the same time, extremists on both sides accompanied the process with violence and accusations of betrayal. The same extremists who were purposely left out of the process turned out to be stronger than it.

This assertion, to various degrees, was held by many interviewees and participants.

Another key variable is how the organizational type or form of a P2P organization informs their view on the centrality and viability of coordinated strategy. In previous study, specifically on the Israeli P2P field (Perlman and Schwartz, KATU 2000), classic peace groups, including protest and solidarity organizations tended more than then service provider and policy/development NGO’s to provide a vision, with varying degrees of clarity, regarding a final status agreement between the parties.

The possession or lack of such a vision regarding future relations between the two peoples constitutes a core element to an organization’s ability to create, let alone forge with other partners a coordinated strategy. Though organizational typologies are not the purview of this particular research effort, one might postulate that classic peace groups in displaying a greater propensity towards articulating and refining such a vision and translating it into a coherent strategy, possess a capacity to navigate through a crisis of the kind experienced presently.
Dr. Ifat Maoz of Hebrew University has identified several common guiding principles employed by various P2P bodies:

One principle is symmetry or equality in the project: who initiates the project, how much people are involved in it, how much they take responsibility for it, to what extent the project fulfills the needs of both sides in terms of language...I could say negotiated responsiveness to the needs of both populations. Other things are talking about long-term rather than short-term processes; broadening the target population to include more than one sector, multipliers, wider concentric circles of youth, parents, teachers and principals; including uni-national meetings in the process.

We have denoted a common confusion between the notion of strategy and the various means or methodologies of achieving that strategy. The fact that many of the P2P and other peace activists are singularly (and admittedly) un-strategic in their thinking and understanding about why and what they do, tends to muddle this issue. Many P2P activists, openly lack an intentional strategy. This lack of ‘strategic intentionality’ coupled with the sheer diversity of the field, its plurality of disciplines and concomitant lexicons, invite subsequent difficulties in forging a common strategic language. This difficulty has become even more magnified in the last two years, especially in the effort to forge coordinated strategies between NGO players, both uni-nationally and in the cross-border context (See context section).

A very general common feature of People-to-People strategies is that of the overall express purpose of these activities which are to create situations in which Palestinians and Israelis will come to know one another, and as an extension of that, will also come to a better understanding of each other, and so on from there. As one participant stated:

Every project must reflect 1) the population targeted; 2) Structure of project; 3) its overall goals, but the truth is that the only common feature of any P2P strategy is the facilitating of direct, unfettered contact between Israelis and Palestinians. Though even here, sometimes capacity building among the Palestinians is the express goal of a project and even though this might not be consistent with classic P2P, it is in the Palestinian interest, since it engages them and helps them to build their society.

The following reflection of a P2P activist reflects a first step in acknowledging the difficulty described in this section and moving forward in such a way that recognizes the strengths, difficulties and limitations of integrating coordinated strategies with the inherent bottom up, civil society nature of many of the P2P players.
The need for coordinated strategies is a key point in this analytical/reflective exercise and more so, on the ground. The ‘reality test’ undertaken in this research reinforces the general difficulty of the Israeli and Palestinian peace NGO communities, (with or without respective government support or buy-in), to find the ever elusive means to systematically tap into the power of their message and tools and create a formidable synergy both within and between their respective societies.

One point that seems to be clear is that the Israeli and Palestinian P2P NGO’s that have survived since September 2000 all have the capability of articulating what is for them a clear and coherent strategy for their work. While many acknowledge that they have adjusted or changed their strategy/ies since September 2000, the evidence of an articulate strategy for P2P work suggests that this is an essential aspect of being able to continue and sustain this work at the same time that majority public opinion is moving in the opposite direction.

I believe that many P2P initiatives were motivated by a lot of good will of a lot of good people. Many said: let’s bring Israelis and Palestinians together. They’ll like each other and we will contribute to making peace. Well, Israelis and Palestinian don’t automatically like each other and sometimes encounters between them are not so successful. The field of P2P requires professionals to do professional work. Professionals in any field don’t do anything without clearly understanding what they do, why they do it, how they do and how they confront challenges when it doesn’t all quite go the way they planned for. How can anyone enter this very complex field of P2P without have a clear strategy for their work? I believe that not only should each activity have a strategic plan behind it, I believe that all of the efforts of P2P should have a combined comprehensive strategy behind it. If we are to have impact, real impact on peace making, we must work together, NGO’s, donors, and governments – Israelis and Palestinians – on a strategic plan or strategic plans. We must think and act strategically. The enemies of peace act and think strategically, we must also.
Partnerships and Partnering: The Challenges of Working Together

**Rationale:** The topic of partnering and partnerships is a very interesting and challenging one. It is embedded in lots of frustration and hope. Frustration due to the sometimes seemingly insurmountable difficulties involved; and hopes that such partnerships may lead to better understanding of the other and thus bring peace closer to home. Palestinians and Israelis in general share the same dream of peace that requires the help of the other, and so for the People-to-People practitioners the recognition of the need to work together in partnership is clearly articulated as a means to achieve this dream.

**Types of Partnership:** In looking at the issue of partnerships, it is important to view them through the prism of the type of activity or project to which they adhered. One may place partnership along a continuum, at one end, there were those P2P organizations with a full partnership within the same organization – the joint Israeli-Palestinian organizations. This is least common, most difficult, but most rewarding, as reported by the interviewees. At the other end, there were those separate Israeli and Palestinian organizations who worked separately and independently of the other but were engaged in P2P activities. In between, were various other types of partnerships. The quality of the partnerships varied and with the variety were differing levels of partnerships in planning, implementation, budgeting, capacity-building and so on. Each one fitted a different context, different circumstances, different population. Often the nature of the partnerships were determined to large extent by the personalities of the heads of the partnering organization and their ability and desire to create a relationship based on parity and equality.

**Nature of Partnership:** In societies in conflict, there is usually a lack of mutual trust between the adversaries. There is also usually an imbalance in power relationships and in our context, this is clear with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. The imbalance in power between Israelis and Palestinians has also been expressed in relationships and partnerships between Israeli and Palestinian P2P organizations. This was expressed to a large extent by Palestinian participants in this study. It was also reported that when donors or practitioners see that the weaker side is treated on an equal level and with trust, they tend to become more supportive of P2P activities. Otherwise, they find it difficult to fund a project that is already undermined by distrust and hegemony of one partner over the other. In general P2P projects fell along this continuum: Some partnerships were very formal with signed contracts while others were less formal. There is not necessarily a direct correlation between the formality of the relationship and the quality of the relationship; however, many of the participants in this study mentioned the need to formalize the relations with written agreements or memoranda of understandings.
Successful Partnerships: Successful partnerships were those that showed the potential to illuminate the possibilities for successful cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis on all levels. Joint projects, and more specifically jointly run organizations, served as a ‘crystal ball’ that gave the parties and their respective societies a glimpse of how relations between the peoples might look in the future. Successful partnerships or successfully run joint P2P organizations practice symmetry and mutual respect in their programming and functioning, and as a result as a model to the outside world. One key to successful partnerships is real shared management of the projects, their resources, the decision making practices and balanced overall shared responsibility.

Partnership in Project Implementation

Joint Operations: Many interviewees mentioned that successful P2P activities were those that operated jointly with a process of joint decision making by Israelis and Palestinians. Many of these successful projects were held in both locations: Israel and Palestine. Both partner organizations shared the project budget equally. Such partnerships ranged from fairly formal to fairly intimate. Not surprisingly, the more Israelis and Palestinians worked together on the implementation of projects, the more informal it got and discussions became more and more honest and open. P2P organizations who worked together regularly developed a good rapport with their counterparts and a good framework of relations developed. To a large extent, many of these partners remained in contact with each other, at least on a personal level, after the outbreak of violence in September 2000. Even if they did not continue to work together on P2P projects after the beginning of the intifada, the level and quality of contacts between individuals involved in P2P activities prior to September 2000 determined to a great extent the level of contact and cooperation after September 2000.

Joint Ownership: No doubt, the sense of joint ownership in P2P activities was a very important aspect of P2P projects. It was not just sharing responsibility or equal distribution of funds. Sometimes, as pointed out by some of those interviewed, the funds were not distributed equally because the needs were different. Due to shared feelings of ownership each side involved in P2P activities felt they were investing in the project because it responds to their specific needs, and in response to those needs,
a certain kind of ownership would be built up. The nature of ownership reported by interviewees differed greatly. More often than not the initiatives for projects and contact came from the Israeli sides. While this often determined a limited sense of joint ownership expressed by Palestinians, it was not universally the case. There was also great evidence of real joint ownership of the projects in all aspects. The level of the real sense of joint ownership correlates to a great extent with the level of expressed success of the project as a whole.

**Fundamentally, we divided the money among the Palestinians & Israelis almost on the basis of pure equality. The available money for operations was pretty evenly divided. It was all transparent, even though we (Israelis) raised 95% of the funds. We didn't scrutinize their expenses ("if a bus cost more than they quoted, we didn't interfere"). I think the Palestinians realized that this was done in an equal way and that this strengthened the relations between us. The basis of our work was and is that if you are serious, you work on the basis of equality. The institutional frameworks put into place [for our programs] reflect this. We were never "Experts on what is good for Palestinians". We tried to work on a basis of true partnership and equality even when we put more into it than they did, for whatever reason and made sure never to be the boss (despite an asymmetry in fundraising). This is the way one has to go about it if you believe in P2P programming.**

**Joint Responsibilities:** Having joint responsibilities was a central aspect for successful P2P operations. From projects that were described as successful P2P activists mentioned that they felt responsible for what the project aimed to accomplish and how it materialized. In many successful P2P projects both Israeli and Palestinian partners reported feeling it was "their own project" – a clear articulation of holding joint responsibilities. In some cases, where less than successful projects were reported, some of the interviewees reported not feeling a sense of ownership and direct responsibility, sometimes even stating that the project was really one that belonged to the "other" partner.

**Asymmetry Issue:** Many Palestinian interviewees mentioned lack of parity and lack of symmetry in the partnership patterns as problematic issues in implementing P2P projects. A number of P2P projects suffered from lack of symmetry, lack of parity, and lack of equality. This was partly due to the fact, as stated by Palestinian interviewees, that the Israeli partners had more knowledge, better skills, and wider experience in implementing these kinds of projects along with more extensive contacts with donors. In the early 1990s when P2P projects began, few Palestinian
partners were in a position to submit adequate project proposals. They lacked the technical skills and know-how required for writing good proposals. The trend was that Israeli NGOs took the initiative to propose projects to donors. Some Palestinian NGO's stated that they were approached by some Israeli NGO’s after the projects had already been conceptualized and sometime already funded (to the Israeli side). In many P2P projects, the Israelis were the ones to come up with the idea of the proposal, write the progress reports, collect the funds and disburse them. At the beginning of the P2P process in the early 1990s, often the role of the Palestinian NGOs was very minimal in the initial stages. The Israeli NGOs often took initiative to draft the proposal and to seek a Palestinian NGO because they needed a counterpart. Some Palestinian interviewees reported that this sometimes created a sense among Palestinians that both Israelis and donors perceived their role in P2P activities as negligible.

However, as years passed, Palestinian partners became much riper for a genuine symmetry. There was great improvement in reported symmetry and sense of real partnerships with organizations that had longer track records and more experience in implementing P2P projects. The more experienced the organizations involved, the more articulated awareness there seemed to be regarding issues of partnering and partnerships as a crucial and critical element of creating successful joint projects. There were NGO’s on both sides that reported levels of parity in partnerships between Israelis and Palestinians that far transcended the inherent reality of asymmetry on the ground, a situation which was particularly exacerbated since Al-Aqsa Intifada broke out in late September 2000.

In many successful P2P projects, the symmetry between both sides was complete. The planning, the handling of funds, the execution of activities were jointly and cooperatively performed. As a rule, this was very important in P2P projects and as expressed by interviewers was always preferable. This type of symmetry allayed the suspicions that one side wanted to have full control of the project. At the same time, one must concede that there were projects that were successful though they did not feature complete symmetry between the two sides.

In the beginning, many projects were not designed together, but as time passed, it became more and more a shared process. However, in designing a project, many P2P organizations did not find it absolutely important to seek out perfect symmetry but rather to define each side’s needs and address them. It was evident that needs of each
side were different; in addition to a political and pervasive societal asymmetry, there was a need to deal with lack of organizational symmetry with sensitivity. It was noted over and over again, that issues of lack of parity in partnerships expressed themselves primarily through the prism of budgetary issues and relations with donors. Palestinian are different from those of the Israelis and thus there is sometimes a need to address such a problem in budgetary terms.

It should also be noted that donors also gained more knowledge over time in dealing with the issues of partnering and partnerships. Some donors signed separate contracts with each partner organization. Some donors signed one contract but insisted on both partners signing the contract together. Issues of money distribution were more complex and it was not always handled with the same sense of equality and equity. This is a problematic issue for which both the donors and the partner organizations need to work on. It seems to be clear that successful partnerships were those in which this issue was dealt with in advance of the project implementation stages and in which the partners discussed the issue openly, without hesitation and reached agreements and understandings between themselves and with the donors.

Some interviewees reported that both sides tended to confuse equality with symmetry. The situation on the ground was far from being symmetric in many ways, but often in terms of NGO relationships, many felt it did not have to be. At times, symmetry was just one way to avoid deeper discussions about each side's needs and abilities. P2P NGOs definitely felt responsive to building symmetric relationship in dealing with each other, and also with their target groups when they set projects up.

**Capacity-building Issue:** Some P2P projects were also or mainly development projects aimed to assist Palestinian organizations and Palestinian society. Some of these projects were capacity building projects and technology transfer projects in which Israelis transferred know how or provided training for Palestinians. These were not balanced projects in terms of the numbers of participants or in terms of the distribution of budgets. The Palestinian side at times received more funding to build the capacity of their institutions. On other occasions they received less than 50% of the budget because they did not need to do certain tasks, which the other side performed. Thus it varied in principle, depending on whether it was a P2P dialogue project or a development project. If it was a development project, donors had to take into consideration what was needed on each side and usually, almost always, development funds were only available to the Palestinian side.
Team Building Issue: It can be difficult for two organizations whose people had been fighting for decades, with different cultures, different backgrounds, and different history to find themselves for the first time joining efforts to act as one team to implement a joint P2P project. P2P organizations needed to be very conscious of team-building, particularly since it was a joint activity. Without having a team spirit, P2P organizations get stuck. Some interviewees reported that the trick to keeping the relationships sound was in paying attention to a constant need to negotiate in an ongoing fashion. Some partners spoke of their relationships as “marriages” that had their ups and downs and sometimes need “marriage counselors” to help them overcome difficulties. Almost all interviewees reported the need to be have heightened awareness to the needs and feelings of their partners and reported a consistent desire to work on those relationships as they recognized their crucial importance to achieve success in their work.

Agenda Setting Issue: Many P2P organization had their own agenda and they were not always fully aware of the other side’s agenda. Many of those projects that proved successful were those with a joint agenda in which one partner did not attempt to place singular importance on their own agenda exclusively. Many Palestinian NGO’s reported their agendas to be “functional” meaning changing the attitudes of the Israelis regarding the Palestinian national struggle – to support Palestinian statehood, division of Jerusalem, removal of settlements, etc. Many Israeli NGO’s reported that their agendas were more process oriented focusing more on relationship building – becoming friends, knowing the others, etc. The different agendas of the two sides
were not always articulated and partners were not always aware that their counterparts had a different agenda. Certainly with time and experience, it became easier for partners to discuss their different agendas. It also became possible to either agree on a single agenda or to find ways of sharing agendas or integrating them into the same project.

**Patronizing Issue:** Many Palestinian NGO’s reported feelings of being treated in a patronizing fashion by some of their partners. Some expressed that at time they felt that their partner came to them with a set of fixed ideas and tried to impose them on the other, rather than conducting a give and take approach. Some Palestinian NGO’s left the arena of being involved in P2P projects because of their sense of being patronized. This was not the overall trend, but some interviewees expressed a sense that their partners were not always aware that they patronized. Most interviewees did not report being patronized but clearly understood that this could be a real problem and could jeopardize the entire project.

**Cultural Issue:** Successful partnership reflected sensitivity on part of each partner with regard to the constraints imposed on work culturally, socially, economically, and politically. The cultural environment of each side is different. Many interviewees reported that they did not know much about the culture of the other, and often they did not speak even the language of the other. Most interviewees felt that the understanding each other’s culture and language is very important and many expressed that this was also not a significant aspect of their own activities. Many felt that more attention needs to be placed on this in future projects.

**The Importance of the Partnership Issues as Raised in the Interviews**

It seems that the challenges of the partnership relations were raised more often by Palestinians than by Israelis. There were four specific sensitivities that Palestinians rose regarding their relations with Israeli NGOs.

The first sensitivity was the sensitivity around the national aspirations. When a project was designed, there was often a debate between Palestinian and their Israeli partners about political goals and aspirations. Sometime the debate focused on functional issues, depending on the nature of the program. For example, the question was raised of whether the Palestinian dream or plan should parallel the national Israeli dream. This needed to be worked out. Do Palestinians want their national health system to be like that of the Israeli one?

The second sensitivity was the conflicting assumptions between the two sides. The biggest one Palestinians found in their working relationships was that the sometimes Israelis assumed that things simply cannot happen on the Palestinian side. This was
quite problematic. This sometimes involved questions regarding cultural issues. These underlying assumptions sometime impacted on P2P work and were reported as problematic from the Palestinian point of view.

The third sensitivity was the issue of priorities. After September 2000, the importance of P2P to most Palestinians decreased significantly. Most Palestinian P2P NGO’s were more interested in addressing the crisis and in finding solidarity from their partners with Palestinian suffering.

The fourth sensitivity raised by some Palestinian NGOs was their sense that some important Israeli P2P organizations found it more useful to deal only with the elite Palestinian political leadership. They were not willing to deal with those NGOs that were not part of the Palestinian elites.

I couldn't imagine talking about a hematology or oncology program with (an Israeli hospital named here) when I had to evacuate 43 dialysis patients who were unable to get to their homes because of the Israeli incursion. At that time, this major project with the hospital totally stopped, and our Israeli friends were very upset about the donor and this and that.

Another observation is that some of the Israeli NGO's unfortunately like to deal only with the elite Palestinian political leadership. They approach the head of the establishment and they even don't want to deal with somebody's assistant. They want to see the leader. They want to deal with him directly. Then they themselves are not willing to deal with the people. They want to deal with the elite because the elite is very important. And it's the same thing with some of the Palestinians. The elite make for good marketing with the donors. So they're looking at the marketing aspect rather than at developing relationships. Then the Palestinian staff of the elite will say, Look, they're trying to bypass us. They're only concerned with image. A political relationship has to be developed.
P2P NGO-DONOR RELATIONS

At the root of the issue concerning NGO-Donor relations was the widely-held sense among practitioners that in order to really effect change, more money was needed to fund larger projects with farther reaching objectives and implications. All interviewees expressed a strong sense that there was not enough funding to make a really serious impact in Israeli and Palestinian societies, yet this was clearly what the donors expected. The NGO interviewees universally felt that the donor community was not making a serious effort on its own to place enough resources in this field. When the crisis situation erupted in September 2000, many interviewees expressed that their donor partners reported feeling that perhaps they had wasted their money by investing in P2P. Many of the NGO’s reported feeling angry that they were being held “responsible” for the failings of the peace process and for the public support for violence on both sides. Almost all of the NGO’s expressed a feeling that if they had been granted more financial resources there would have been a more direct impact on public opinion although it is unlikely that this alone could have prevented the breakdown of the peace process.

Donors as Safety Net: P2P organizations and Donors were partners in promoting the peace process, and many felt from their experience, that there were advantages in working with donors. When an Israeli-Palestinian program was initiated by a donor or when the donor was an actual partner taking part in the project itself as a third party, this constituted a kind of safety net for P2P organizations. The donors, as a third party provided a kind of neutrality, legitimacy and support. Thus they were needed for sponsorship, for their neutrality, and also to check accountability and transparency. This is perhaps especially valid after September 2000 when conducting P2P activities became much for difficult.

In my eyes, donors are partners. We tend to believe that they need us, the people who do the work on the ground. When a sum of money is allocated, they have to show results, and they're not able to do that without us doing the work, and doing good work. It's ironic. We think we are dependent on them, but they are equally dependent on us.

Quality of Delivery: Donors were concerned with project quality delivery within the agreed period. This placed increasing pressure on both Israeli and Palestinian organizations to deliver on time. It the NGO had a good record of delivery then it stood a better chance to be funded in the future. Many donors, over time, also set higher standards for greater professionalism. These higher demands by the donors enhanced the quality of projects since NGO had to meet certain criteria and standards.
Building a relationship with a donor was conducive not only to receiving more funds, but also to creating the trust that an organization was contributing to the welfare of the community. In this way, many of the viable NGOs flourished. Unfortunately not all the NGO's were that well organized. In periods of drought, some organizations ceased to exist.

We have been assessing programs, and we conducted this research on 150 health projects between 1994 and 1998. One of the criteria that came out for the success of working with donors was that, when a project is successful, it becomes easy for the donors to refund a second project, and a third. You develop a relationship with them. It's like dialoguing with the donors. You build trust. They know whether you're doing good or bad work, and it helps a lot in the second and third and fourth cycles. So the strategy I would recommend for donors and for recipients is, as much as possible, to develop long-term relationships. What we are trying to do among ourselves, we should also adopt that same strategy in our relationships with donors. We have to build trust. Then everything gets easier. Procedures suddenly move faster, and they're more flexible because they know you'll be able to deliver.

From a realpolitik perspective, the most important factor in terms of donor response to P2P activities was, in the final analysis, the perceived impact of these activities on the peace process and stabilization as perceived by the donor communities. The eruption of violence in September 2000 was also a period of great crisis for both donors and P2P NGOs. Some representatives of the larger P2P NGOs reported feeling extremely frustrated by the failure of the donor community to respond effectively to the crisis. At the very time when significantly larger financial resources were necessary, most of the donors froze their funding as a result of their sense of a need for reassessment. The donor hesitation is one of the factors that led to the freezing of activities by the NGOs themselves. There is a dialectic process here which is difficult to determine cause and effect, however, from the point of view of the NGO's there was a failure of the donors to respond to the new needs and new situation effectively.

This is an example of when donors care and how they respond. When the activities have real relevance, when there is a real need, when there is community demand for these activities, when they impact the peace process and stabilization or destabilization, the donors care. This is a very significant example. In less than two months, both the United States and the European Union mobilized dozens of millions of dollars and were able to set up the organizational framework through which these millions would be transferred, without anybody noticing. Most of us here actually don't know about it. This opens up many questions when we compare it to the way many NGO's, including people-to-people NGO's in both Palestine and Israel, are working. We should all learn from this.
P2P NGO-DONOR CHALLENGES

**Bureaucratic Issue:** Due to bureaucratic considerations, it was more convenient for many donors to sign only one contract for a project rather than two parallel contracts, one with the Palestinians and one with the Israelis. P2P organizations did not feel that it was correct to receive money from donors and then deliver it to their counterpart. Donor signing the contract with both organizations resolved this problem.

**Donor-driven agenda Issue:** Palestinians and Israelis interviewed complained of particularly negative experiences with donor-driven agendas. Donors often wanted to fund certain joint projects, which both Palestinians and Israelis did not feel were priorities to them. Thus donors would set priorities of what projects they decided to fund and what not to fund. No doubt, this reflected donor priorities. At one time, democracy, gender and human rights were high topics on donors’ list. So Palestinian and Israeli institutions worked together to develop proposals in these areas to market to the donors, knowing they could get funds for that, even though such issues did not address real peace priorities of concern to them. At times donors designed and shaped the P2P program. They even decided what type of training was needed and some NGO reported that this was imposed on them. Several participants discussed the frustrations of donors dictating their own priorities, at cost to project objectives and community needs, as well as limiting the ability of P2P organization to use allocated funds as they saw fit when circumstances change. The net result of donor-driven agendas resulted in a widespread lack of coordination: that between donors and grantees, and between donors and their advisors.

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*One point about relations with donors. Many times they contribute to the complications or to the problems of the projects we submit to them. Many times they have hidden agendas and compete among themselves, and that affects us negatively as recipients. Many times, within Palestinian or Israeli institutions, certain problems arose because of the practices or the performance of the donors. As was said, each donor has his own political agenda and each wants a stake in the peace process.*

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*They come to us with their priorities and impose them on us. At one time, democracy and human rights was in fashion. So Palestinian and Israeli institutions worked together to develop a proposal in that field to market to the donors, knowing we could get money for that, even though it did not address our real priorities. This is a completely wrong approach, and here we were stuck. It’s time for the donors to take our priorities and our needs into consideration, and to respond accordingly if they want to contribute to peace or development in the area.*
**Donor Inflexibility Issue:** One major issue often alluded to was what one participant referred to as "tyranny of the funder." Funding a P2P project took a long time and went through much complicated procedures. If a P2P proposal was submitted today, it could take months and even more than a year for it to be accepted. Sometimes, with some donors it could take more months to sign a contract, and then the actual money arrived only many months later. Many interviewees alluded to the need for donor flexibility.

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The question is, how can we convince them to be more flexible about changes in the program. It's your proposal. This is your budget. And I know there are procedures for changes, but they're for small changes. They have to be more flexible about serious changes. This is a relatively small issue, but it's not so small when it's your project, you want to spend $100,000, and you can't spend it because what you proposed is no longer relevant, but the issue is relevant.

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**One Party Issue:** In some cases, there were projects implemented by one side without much contribution from the other and donors did not insist on the need to have both Israeli and Palestinian as partners in project implementation. This resulted in creating suspicion and mistrust of the other.

**Transparency Issue:** While donors had to realize they had to be more flexible because of the changing situation, it was also Israeli-Palestinian responsibility to make sure they followed the terms of their contracts with the donors as closely as possible, submit progress reports on time and keep their books properly. When an organization did not do that, it gave other P2P organizations a bad reputation, which damaged the relationship with the donors.

**Accountability Issue:** Donors provided funds earmarked for certain activities. If such grants were not used for their specific purpose, donors did not put any additional money into the project or stopped funding those organizations practicing this. Thus P2P organizations were accountable to donors in how they handle funds. If they took money for a specific project, then donors expected them to spend it on that project and not something else. Funds had to be spent on what the NGO and the donor agreed upon initially. Though at times, delays in funding made P2P proposals no longer relevant.
Financial Issue: In general, P2P did not have much impact. Why? Simply because the total amount of money the international donor community had put into these peace-building activities in the last ten years was equivalent to the cost of about half a Merkava tank. Neither the Government of Israel nor the Palestinian National Authority nor Arab governments put one cent into P2P activities. Over the years, the amount of funds available grew, however, once the peace process began, much of the international money got funneled into many international organizations or university based projects in foreign universities, often not working at all with local Israeli and Palestinian NGO’s. As these international and foreign projects were the first to disappear after September 2000, many of the local Israeli and Palestinian NGOs still active in the P2P field feel particular animosity to what they believe was a huge waste of funds. The international-foreign based or initiated projects were much more costly than the local based projects. They report a sense that for the donors the international-foreign projects were often more “sexy” to the donors and thus they received much larger amounts of funds than were ever available to the local organizations. One such project mentioned was a joint economic research project based at a major western university that cost millions of dollars while the same work, sometimes with the very same Israeli and Palestinian participants was being conducted locally without funding at all or with extremely limited funding. The local based project was simply considered to have much less prestige than the one based at the major western university.

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You've been talking about such big sums of money here that I am feeling embarrassed. We are fighting to find $5,000 here and $10,000 there. I think about how we're going to pay the rent next month. This confirms something we've known for a long time. Money goes to money. If you are in an institution or a university and in your spare time you work with an NGO, if you are an academic, if you meet with the higher-ups, if you have the connections, it's much easier. When you are not connected and you approach embassies or foundations or business people or whatever, they tell you how much they've already donated to all those big organizations.

There are so many small organizations with really excellent projects that can do wonderful work, but they have such a slim chance, in this set-up, to get any money. Often we hear of big organizations that receive a lot of money for a project and then don't know what to do with it. Sometimes they don't have the experience that the small organizations have, and they waste the money on not very good projects just because they have it. I don't know what can be done about this, but it's a major problem.
In conclusion of this section, it can be clearly stated that the big issue in terms of the work of the P2P organizations as reported by them, was that they were capable of doing much more but there simply was not enough money. There was never enough money for P2P organizations to expand and grow over the years as much as their potential. Funds donated were far less than what the organizations really needed to have to have a more serious impact.
LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We have chosen to focus this section of the report under the title of Lessons and Recommendations. Drawing on the conclusions and input of the participants in the research, we have organized these Lessons and Recommendations into the following subject areas:

1. Objectives of People-to-People activities
2. Strategies for People-to-People activities
3. Questions concerning impact
4. Public Legitimacy
5. Coordination, Cooperation and Transparency
6. Issues Concerning the Donors
7. Logistics
8. Partnering and Partnerships
9. People-to-People Post September 2000

1. Objectives of People-to-People activities

The participants in the research were unable to agree amongst themselves on a concise inclusive definition of People-to-People activities and what they should include. We would like to suggest that the following elements be included when determining if a given activity “fits” within the Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People realm.

*Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People activities include those actions and activities that aim at bringing Israelis and Palestinians together with the expressed aim of peace-making and peace-building between the peoples of Israel and Palestine.*

It is extremely difficult to provide clear guidelines regarding a prioritization of the kind of activities that should be most encouraged and supported. There is a real sense, both by the diverse nature of the participants in this research and by the vast scope of activities undertaken over the past nine years, that certain recommended criteria might help in determining emphases in terms of what kind of activities should be supported at the current time. These criteria include the following:

- The extent to which the activity will involve and develop real Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, working together and long-term relationships.

- The extent to which the activity will reach out beyond those who participate directly in the activity either through multipliers or through the media.
• The extent to which the activity is conceived of as a continuous longer-term endeavor and not a one-time event.

• The extent to which the activity either produces wider public legitimacy for People-to-People work or has wider public legitimacy built-in to its conception.

• The extent to which the activity has a thought out and articulated coherent strategy for positively influencing attitudes of Israelis and Palestinians towards peace-making and peace-building.

• The extent to which the activity reaches out to new populations who have not previously participated in People-to-People activities.

• The extent to which the organizers of the activity work in a real and equitable partnership.

• The extent to which objectives are responsive to volatile political circumstances and developments.

2. Strategies

Throughout the course of this study, in individual interviews with project organizers, in workshops and seminars, questions were raised with regard to the concept of an overall premeditated strategy or strategies for the work of People-to-People. With some very notable exceptions, for the most part, strategic thinking was by and large not in evidence. This finding is true both on the side of donors and recipients. Is that an indictment of the people-to-people field? We are not sure. From the perspective of this research, the lack of strategy is not the lack of a finding. It is an indication, in our understanding, of the belief that goodwill and an atmosphere of the formal peace process would facilitate a successful people-to-people peace process as well. It is also, in our view, a sense that the people-to-people process was not regarded in the seriousness that we believe it deserves. The lack of strategic thinking, or the almost total absence of coherent strategies for a people-to-people peace process impacted itself on the overall lack of coordination at almost all levels – government, donors, NGO’s and other recipients and activists. We believe that serious thought by NGO’s and donors must be given to the needs for developing coherent and articulated strategies for advancing People-to-People programs. It is recommended that this issue be addressed separately and together by donors and NGO’s. Some of the specific lessons and recommendations concerning the issues of strategies are addressed below:
• **Lesson and Recommendation: Projects Should be a Long-Term Investment**

Changing attitudes is a long-term endeavor. Working over a long period of time with the same people strengthens the abilities of those people to become agents of change within their own communities. Many of those people who have remained dedicated to peace over the past two years of violence are those who have taken part in people-to-people activities over an extended period of time. It is recommended that donors and NGO’s consider these long-term strategies in their planning and implementation.

• **Lesson and Recommendation: Projects Should Include Multiplier Aspects**

It is recommended that People-to-people activities include multiplier aspects built-in to the work. Models for expanding the work beyond the immediate participants ought to be considered as a vital element for having broader impact in the two societies.

• **Lesson and Recommendation: Need to Reach out to non-Elite Groups; Learn Each Other’s Language**

Due to language barriers, more often than not, the participants of P2P activities represent elite groups from both sides. It is recommended that these participants be included in discussions of how to effectively bring the messages and the work of the P2P activities to broader cross-sections of both communities. While the use of translators can be cumbersome and expensive, it is nonetheless thought valuable considering the need to involve non-elite groups of people in People-to-People activities. It is also believed that People-to-People protagonists should advance the possibilities for Israelis and Palestinians to learn each other’s language.

• **Lesson and Recommendation: P2P Work Cannot Exist in a Vacuum**

Work between professional groups is important, however, it is recommended that this work be connected in various ways to the Israeli-Palestinian context. Assumptions should not be made that meetings between people sharing a profession dealing solely with the subject matter of that profession will have a positive impact on the relations of the two sides also considering the need to address the broader questions concerning the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. This is at times somewhat problematic, because in many cases the professional to professional work is carried out by organizations that are not permitted by their mandate to address political issues. Therefore, it might be possible to conceive of
linking these activities with organizations that do deal specifically with the more “political” aspects of the P2P work. There was debate on the importance of addressing the politics of the conflict within the framework of professional-to-professional meetings and whether or not this is possible or even recommended. There was, however, agreement that within the context of professional meetings that the human side of the encounter – who they are, where they come from, what their lives are like and how their lives are influenced by the conflict should be “built-in” to the planning and not be left to chance dialogue.

3. Questions concerning Impact

Most participants in this study noted with disappointment a sense that the People-to-People programs did not achieve the desired impact on public opinion. Many cited the failings of the formal peace process as the main factor that limited the ability of the People-to-People process to influence positive change.

In the present day situation of acute violence there is a tendency to view these activities as having been unsuccessful or as not having an impact. There are very few truly objective means of judging this assumption. Those who make this assumption tend to blame the P2P organizations for failing to create peaceful relations between Palestinians and Israelis that should have emerged and prevented the public support for violence, as has been seen over the past two years. There were great expectations regarding the outcomes and positive results desired from P2P activities by donors and P2P organizations themselves. Yet these expectations were apparently highly exaggerated and not in tune with the scope of these activities, the funding made available to them, and their wider public legitimacy.

Palestinian and Israeli public figures and politicians did not do enough work to provide P2P with the necessary legitimacy amongst their own publics. The anti-normalization campaign in Palestine had a deep impact on the “freedom” that Palestinian NGO’s had to work within their own society. Public statements against the peace process and against the PA in Israel also had their effect on weakening public legitimacy for engaging in P2P activities. The withering of public legitimacy for P2P activities during the course of the peace process had a negative effect on the ability of these activities to have greater impact on the wider societies.
In a broader view, activists in P2P organizations indicated that there was a sense that a public peace process, or the people-to-people process, was very much an afterthought. There did not seem to be a clear, coherent and rational strategy for this work offered at almost any level – by politicians, donors, and the NGO’s themselves. There was almost no coordination amongst the protagonists of this work. There seemed to be little donor coordination as well. Only later, when it was becoming clear that the peace process was gradually but steadily being derailed did some members of the donor community consider the importance of coordination of this work and the need to intervene by providing a mechanism for evaluation and collective thinking. By this time, there was already considerable bitterness on the Palestinian side and a general sense by many that the People-to-People activities were not having the impact desired and hoped for by the activists initiating them.

We believe that the limited impact of the People-to-People process, as described by the participants in this research study, emanates from a multitude of factors which include:

a) Lack of public legitimacy
b) Severe limitations of funding
c) Inability to develop long-term programs with built-in continuation
d) Too much focus on elite groups from both sides; Not enough outreach to “grassroots” populations
e) Little or no inclusion of built-in “multipliers”—creating ambassadors or agents of change to carry on process beyond P2P programs
f) Ineffective strategies for addressing, involving and utilizing the media in the programs

- **Lesson and Recommendation: Use the Media to Create Public Awareness about P2P**

It is recommended that the activities open themselves up to the media. It is also recommended that activities include a plan for creating public awareness about the activities themselves with the aim of informing the wider public and rebuilding confidence in the possibilities of real peace. The publics ought to be made to understand that there are partners on the other side.

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• **Lesson and Recommendation:** Wider Public Needs to be Engaged in and Made Aware of All P2P Activities

While it is understood that certain Track II types of activities must be conducted discretely and out of the light of the media, it is proposed to engage the publics in debate about the issues being discussed. Greater public awareness and debate is important regarding the possibilities for reaching agreements and it is recommended that knowledge of the parameters of those potential agreements be shared with the wider publics on both sides.

4. Public Legitimacy

Many participants in this study noted a sense that the People-to-People process was not “taken seriously” by the officials on both sides. Many expressed the sense that People-to-People was an after-thought. The official People-to-People Process as part of the Oslo Agreement did not place any direct demands on the Government of Israel or on the PA to participate in the funding of these programs or to provide the necessary political legitimacy for them. Like many other aspects of the Oslo Agreements, this Annex was not explicit regarding implementation and responsibilities of the parties.

The agreement stated the following:

**ARTICLE VII**

*The People-To-People Program*

1. The two sides shall cooperate in enhancing the dialogue and relations between their peoples in accordance with the concepts developed in cooperation with the Kingdom of Norway.

2. The two sides shall cooperate in enhancing dialogue and relations between their peoples, as well as in gaining a wider exposure of the two publics to the peace process, its current situation and predicted results.
3. The two sides shall take steps to foster public debate and involvement, to remove barriers to interaction, and to increase the people to people exchange and interaction within all areas of cooperation described in this Annex and in accordance with the overall objectives and principles set out in this Annex.

- **Lesson and Recommendation: Both Governments Need to Sign an Agreement Stating their Commitments to P2P**

We believe that in the future, a new People-to-People agreement should be signed by the Government of Israel and the responsible Palestinian leadership. We propose that the parties should be obligated to spell out their obligations, financial and otherwise, and specific benchmarks of implementation should be explicit.

- **Lesson and Recommendation: Public Leaders Must Provide Legitimacy for P2P**

We strongly recommend that public leaders and politicians provide legitimacy for P2P work to be effective and acceptable. There should be a concerted effort on the part of the NGO’s involved in P2P as well as the donors to “lobby” for positive public statements by Israeli and Palestinian officials in support of people to people activities. These public statements may not be offered automatically and therefore, when and where needed should be “invited” and publicized. We propose that the Donors speak to the political leaders on both sides to encourage the public support of the political levels on both sides.

- **Lesson and Recommendation: P2P Programs Must be Granted More Legitimate Space for Activities**

We recommend that P2P NGO’s, supporters of P2P from within Israeli and Palestinian Governments and donors work together to overcome obstacles in front of P2P activities from within the public sectors of each side. This is of direct importance concerning the need to open more legitimate space for this work within the Israeli and Palestinian educational systems. The resistance to peace education at the official levels of both educational systems must be removed and this requires coordinated and concerted efforts by those with the ability to influence decision makers on both sides. We urge the Donors and concerned politicians from both communities to work together to open up more official space for P2P activities, particularly within the Ministries of Education.
Give more time to working with the existing political parties and government level ministries. Many of us turn to extra-parliamentary activities in despair and cynicism about the official political process here. There is a place for this, but without linkage at the first track level our work is fated to be only symbolic. Aim toward creating a Peace Ministry in the next government.

5. Coordination, Cooperation and Transparency

Almost all of the participants in this study spoke of the need to increase coordination, cooperation and transparency at all levels of P2P work. This was especially emphasized with regards to the NGO’s themselves. There was a sense that little real cooperation existed between the P2P NGO’s. There was a sense verbalized that due to funding constraints, many perceived the “field” as being much more competitive than cooperative. Many of the participants in the evaluation also expressed a sense that there was little cooperation and coordination between the various donors and that donor funds were not utilized effectively as a result.

- **Lesson and Recommendation: Forums for multi-level coordination of People-to-People activities are necessary**

These should include coordination by the NGO’s engaged, both in bi-national meetings as well as in uni-national meetings; coordination and open communication between the NGO’s and relevant government officials from both sides; and between the NGO’s and the donors as well as between the donors and themselves.

- **Lesson and Recommendation: We recommend that Palestinian NGO’s Establish a Forum for Coordination of P2P Activities; Israelis Should Continue Theirs**

The Israeli NGO’s should continue to convene periodic meetings of the Israeli People-to-People NGO’s and the Palestinian NGO’s should establish a similar forum for convening periodic meetings of the Palestinian NGO’s involved in People-to-People activities. These separate meetings are useful for creating internal support for the organizations involved in these activities, for raising issues of mutual concern, and to confront challenges that the organizations are facing. At least one of the donors should take responsibility for providing support for the convening of these meetings, while the NGO’s themselves must take responsibility for ensuring that the meetings are held. It is recommended that at least four such meetings take place on each side during the course of a year.
• **Lesson and Recommendation:** At Least One Annual Several-Day Conference of All P2P Players Should be convened

At least once a year a several-day meeting of Israeli and Palestinian People-to-People NGO leaders and donors should be convened to brainstorm and coordinate their activities and plans. This meeting should be used to review progress, to discuss planning and strategies and to work out and work on emerging problems and challenges. Perhaps, this could be undertaken by the Country holding the Presidency of the European Union. Participants must include the representatives of the primary donors to People-to-People activities and the main Israeli and Palestinian NGO’s. Official representatives of the Governments of Israel and Palestine should also attend.

A coalition is one of our priorities under such emergency circumstances. Sometimes each side feels paralyzed, impotent. They want to do something. Strengthening communication would help to circulate ideas that might encourage action. Definitely, on the Palestinian side, the situation is ripe for engaging the people away from violence and towards peace activities, even if just a demonstration where they can express themselves. I believe that both sides are tired of the situation and are ready to go to the streets, especially if we have ideas for the future of the region.

6. Issues Concerning the Donors

Many grievances were raised by both recipients and donors alike concerning People-to-People. In general, there was a sense of a gap of understanding between some of the donors and some of the recipients. There was a sense verbalized that there is significant room and need for improvement in this area.

• **Lesson and Recommendation:** More Funding for Long-Term and Continuous Programs

We propose that donors should be prepared to allocate funds for People-to-People for multi-year, continuous and on-going programs. Recognizing that this is sometime difficult due to budgetary restrictions at home, efforts should be made by the donors to convince their governments of the real needs enabling long-term planning and implementation of programs that require time and continuous efforts to insure the success of having impact and changing attitudes.
• **Lesson and Recommendation: More Attention to Constraints and Difficulties Imposed by Joint-Structure**

We recommend that donors be more aware of the difficulties of implementing programs by Israeli and Palestinian NGO’s trying to cooperate under very adverse circumstances. We propose that donors make allowances for the extra costs involved in having a joint structure of people from both sides to run the programs – an issue that involves additional funds.

• **Lesson and Recommendation: Additional Funding to Allow for Programs Being Held Abroad**

Donors should be willing to make allowances for programs being implemented outside of Israel and Palestine due to the great difficulties involved in holding Israeli-Palestinian meetings in Israel and Palestine at this time. This also involves additional funding.

• **Lesson and Recommendation: We recommend that donors Hold NGO’s politically Accountable for Activities**

We propose that donors be aware that those NGO’s applying for funds show a consistent public record in favor of these activities. The international public funds available are too limited to be diverted to organizations that utilize those funds while at the same time join public campaigns against P2P activities. We recommend that NGO’s applying for funds for People-to-People activities be committed to a public stance in favor of these activities.

• **Lesson and Recommendation: We recommend that donors Support of P2P Activities Should be Transparent**

We believe that Donors should be more transparent about their support of People-to-People activities, both to present to the public their priorities and to enable discussion and dialogue on People-to-People strategies.

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In my opinion, from years of working in this field, building a relationship with a donor is conducive not only to receiving more funds, but also to creating the trust that this organization or this NGO is contributing to the welfare of the community. In this way, many of the viable NGO’s have actually flourished.
7. Logistics

The current violence, the restrictions on movement, the inability to conduct meetings on a regular basis creates great difficulties in implementing Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People projects at this time. Nonetheless, programs and activities have been held successfully over the past two years. There are great obstacles in the way of conducting this work, however possibilities do still exist.

- **Lesson and Recommendation**: Need for Coordination in Lobbying Israeli Security Officials with Regard to Securing Permits for Palestinian Participants

Under the current difficult situation, the possibilities for joint meetings of Israelis and Palestinians are extremely limited. Many of these meetings must be held abroad. The security situation has made it increasingly difficult for movement and travel. We have found that directed lobbying of the Israeli security officials with the help of politicians, public figures, and the donors has aided in the process of securing permits for Palestinian participants. The process is still much too cumbersome and arbitrary. This issue must be undertaken in a coordinated and concerted effort by all concerned in order to ease the bureaucracy and to enable more people to participate.

- **Lesson and Recommendation**: More Emphasis Needed on Uni-National Work Now

Uni-national meetings addressing peace-making and peace-building can also be held within the framework of People-to-People activities. There seems to be a great need and desire to include the uni-national elements of this work within this framework and this seems completely legitimate at this time.

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Many peace-building activities need to be done separately. With peace education programs, a lot of the work has to take place separately in the Israeli classroom and in the Palestinian classroom before the students ever meet. Then after they meet, there's more follow-up work that has to be done separately because they need to digest what they learned from the meeting. They need to talk about it, understand it and digest it. These
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8. Partnering and Partnerships

After September 2000, many of the cooperative projects of Israeli and Palestinian NGO's working on People-to-People activities ceased their work. There was a deep sense of disappointment on both side regarding the political responses and reactions
from the partners. There was also a general question raised following the breakdown of the peace process about the motives and attitudes of people who had been working together for peace. Many accusations were raised across the conflict lines by people who shortly before had been partners in People-to-People activities. A grouping of some Palestinian NGO’s called for a boycott of People-to-People activities, naming some of the Israeli NGO’s specifically as being “worthy” of the boycott. There was a general breakdown of many partnerships and it seemed that People-to-People activities had completed come to an end.

In reality, a number of organizations and activities continued despite the new situation. Some of those organizations and activities have even grown during the past two years. The subject of partnering and partnerships was raised by almost all of the participants in this study. The following are the main lessons and recommendations raised:

- **Lesson and Recommendation: A True Sense of Parity and Equality is Necessary for Successful Partnership**

  The activities and organizations that have continued and sustained themselves over the past two years tend to be those with the highest levels of joint work and true partnerships. The issue of partnerships across the conflict line should not be underestimated. This requires a high level of coordination and building understanding at the institutional level. Transparency between the partners is essential. Developing a true sense of parity and equality in all levels of working together are the guidelines for sustainability.

- **Lesson and Recommendation: Donors Can Help by Creating a Sense of Parity in Regard to Contracts and Funding**

  Donors can help in the partnering process by developing mechanisms for joint contracts between the organizations and means for funding both sides of the project (rather than transferring the funds to only one of the partners). An alternative is a single contract co-signed by both partners.

- **Lesson and Recommendation: Establish Terms of Partnership from the Outset**

  We propose that Partners develop a plan for how they will work together and how decisions will be made. It is advisable for partners to write and sign memoranda of understanding between them as part of the submission of the project proposal for funding. The use of the funds and the means of allocating the
funds should be clear and written down prior to the outset of working on the project. It was in this area that many conflicts developed between partners.

- **Lesson and Recommendation: Complete Parity in Funding is not Always Possible**

Funding between the partners does not necessarily have to be equal. There are situations in which one of the organizations (usually the Palestinian side) will have greater needs for capacity development, equipment or other needs, and it should be seen as possible for one side to receive a larger share of the available funds based upon agreements between the partners and with the donors.

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**From our personal experience, running a joint program or joint organization is a constant negotiation, very much like a marriage. A good marriage is characterized by open communication between the partners. Issues are raised all the time and discussed, and you don't hide your feelings. To avoid these problems, this must also be true with regard to partnerships between organizations. We have to put the problems on the table and deal with them, confront them, negotiate them. Sometimes we even have to bring in a third party to help us talk about them.**

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**9. P2P Post September 2000**

It is important and healthy that we keep our cross-borders friendships and professional contacts. But in the present violent reality, it would be hubristic in the extreme to think that the same small groups of Israelis and Palestinians, a few thousand at most on either side, are sufficient and acceptable leadership to bring about or sustain change. Nonetheless, it is very important to encourage Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People activities at this time both in order to cement the infrastructure of People-to-People programs for future expansion and as a means of keeping alive the message that there “are people on the other side to talk with”.

- **Lesson and Recommendation: Special Attention Needs to be to those Directly Affected by the Conflict**

Special efforts should be made to involve and include populations which have most suffered as a result of the conflict. In these times, we must make mention of refugee populations in camps throughout the West Bank and Gaza, victims of violence and terrorism, and populations living on the borders of Israel and Palestine.
• **Lesson and Recommendation: P2P Efforts Need to be Inclusive of All Voices in Public Debate over Peace-Making**

Without high-level public support during the critical phase of political transition, and without including all political sectors, even the most extreme, in the public discussion, it is mere romanticism to think that a group of high-minded individuals, with a minimum of financial and governmental backing, can be an effective partner to or catalyst of any peace agreement. There has to be a concerted effort to be inclusive, to make peace-building a national priority, not a privileged game for the initiates. It is recommended that the initiators of People-to-People activities consider how to expand the scope of the participants in the programs in order to also include those who are not automatically supportive of the same general political goals and strategies.

There was an expectation raised by participants in this study that expressions of solidarity with suffering be incorporated into People-to-People activities. There were discussions regarding “emergency needs”, mainly for Palestinians that should be addressed by People-to-People programs. There was no unanimity of opinion on this issue, however, it was raised with considerable emotion and should be mentioned. The general sense raised is that People-to-People program should also address real needs of real people. Clearly, there is a debate regarding whether or not People-to-People activities should address and be involved with “development” programs. Some of the participants expressed that People-to-People programs were not effective and did not have impact because they didn’t change the lives of people on the ground. The peace process certainly did not improve the lot of most Palestinians and it seems somewhat erroneous to place the “blame” or weight of responsibility for this on the shoulders of the People-to-People activities.

This report reflects an honest and critical self evaluation of many people who have devoted their lives to bridging the gaps between Israelis and Palestinians. Despite the clear criticisms that have been raised throughout the course of this evaluation, it should also be clear to the reader that there is also a universal agreement that this work must continue and be strengthened. None of those people or institutions who have been leading the field suggested that people-to-people activities should be stopped or postponed.

The tendency of critics of people-to-people activities to place blame for the failure of the Oslo peace process on the protagonists of people-to-people was completely rejected. In fact, there was complete agreement that one of the reasons for the failure of the peace process was because the people-to-people process was not taken seriously enough and not enough financial resources were invested in this field.
We should all feel encouraged that hope and faith in the cause of people-to-people activities has not ceased. Over the past year we have seen projects coming back to life again and hopefully they will bear fruit in the future. We hope that the hard work and the feeling of cooperation that was put in to this paper will contribute to all those people who are engaged in people to people work.
Appendix I:

Palestinian Interviewees:
1. Suheir Jaouni—Palestinian Center for Regional Studies (PCRS)
2. Dr. Ziad Abdeen—Al Quds University
3. Khuloud Khayyat—Al Quds University
4. Dr. Nazmi Al-Jubeh—Birzeit University, Orient House
5. Marwan Hassasea—Bethlehem University
6. Louay Husseini—People’s Peace Campaign
7. Saman Khoury—People’s Peace Campaign; Ministry of Culture
8. Armi Dajani—Jericho Cable Car Project/PNA
9. Dr. Walid Salem—Panorama
10. Abu El-Walid Dajani—Tourism Consultant
11. Omar Daoudi—UNDP/PAPD
12. Issa Kassesiah—Arab Studies Society
13. Dr. Mohammad Dajani—Al-Quds University
14. Dr. Munther Dajani—PCRS
15. Hanna Siniora—Crossing Borders
16. Dr. Salem Aweiss—Birzeit University
17. Dr. Hisham Labadi—World Bank
18. Mohammad Tanji—Windows
19. Dr. Tawfik Nassar—Augusta Victoria Hospital
20. Oula Jaouni—Augusta Victoria Hospital
21. Dr. Zakaria Al-Qaq-- IPCRI

Israeli Interviewees:
1. Prof. Dan Bar-On, PRIME
2. Yehuda Paz, NISPED
3. Ruti Atzmon—WINDOWS
4. Hagit Raanan
5. Anat Reisman-Levy of IPCRI Peace Education
6. Ami Isseroff MidEastWeb for Coexistence, RA
7. Randi Garber, JDC-Brookdale Institute; JDC-Israel
8. Hadass Ziv - Physicians for Human Rights
9. Dr. Dan Bitan, CRB
10. Dr. Ron Pundak (E.C.F.) Currently Director-General, Peres Center
11. Rabbi Ron Kronish—ICCI
12. Adina Shapira—MECA
13. Yael Agmon—Israel-Palestine Educational and Technological Training Center at Kerem Shalom
14. Alexandra Meir-- European Commission
15. Hadass Ziv – Physicians for Human Rights
16. Dr. Gershon Baskin--IPCRI
Appendix II:

**Ending the conflict is possible only through Dialogue and Negotiations for Peace**

3 July 2001

We, the Israeli Organizations who work to advance Israeli- Palestinian cooperation, dialogue and peace between the two peoples call upon the Israeli and Palestinian people and their leaders to cease all acts of violence, return to the negotiation table, to dialogue, and to adopt the Mitchell plan. There is no alternative to a real peace process based on fairness and equality.

We call upon the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority to act immediately and to end all acts of violence that are bringing us to an unnecessary war. We call for a freeze on the settlements activities; a lifting of the curfews, blockades and sieges imposed on the Palestinian population and to bring to a complete halt all violence and incitement of both sides. Each and every act of violence creates a cycle that hurts civilians, escalates extremism and causes unnecessary loss of life.

We are concerned and anxious about the polarization and about the extreme voices we are hearing on both sides in the past few months. We call upon the sides to stop all incitement and to end the use of language of violence, racism and intimidation. In these days, we are also working to convenes peaceful encounters between Israelis and Palestinians through dialogues which are based upon equality, mutual recognition and respect, in order to bring the two peace camps closer together.

We, and the organizations which we represent, strengthen and reinforce our commitment to dialogue and to the process of mutual recognition and respect. In this period of crisis, we call on our friends and partners from the Palestinian and the Israeli peace camps – It is our duty to speak up and call for the end of the aggression, occupation and build a peaceful neighborly relationship between the State Israel and the Palestinian State.
Appendix III:

Press Release –
By the General Assembly of PNGO Network

An emergency meeting was held by the General Assembly of PNGO network on Sunday 22 October 2000 to discuss the current political situation, in light of the escalation of violence by the Israeli army.
It is becoming clear that extremism and racist are growing fast in Israel. This has led to more intensive measures by the Israeli army against the Palestinian civilians. Israel government is intensifying its propaganda against the Palestinian people through distortion of facts and using false information.

In this context, PNGO Network has made the following decision:

1. To ask Palestinian NGOs to halt their joined projects with the Israeli side, particularly the “people to people” projects and programs related to Peres Institute for “Peace”, Moreover joined projects funded by USAID, or any program which contain an approach of “normalization”.

2. To ask all Palestinian NGOs to withdraw from any basic joint projects with Israelis. In this respect, we call upon the Palestinian Authority to stop and boycott these programs.

3. To ask Arab NGOs to halt all joint activities with Israeli organizations, until the end of the Israeli occupation and withdrawal from the lands occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, is realized.

4. To ask the Palestinian NGOs to discontinue any transaction with Israeli NGOs, until they recognize publicly and according to their own legal references the right of the Palestinians to establish a state in West Bank and Gaza strip, with Jerusalem as its capital, and the right of return for the Palestinian refugees.

5. To identify Palestinian and Arab NGOs which do not follow these requests, and publish and distribute a list of them to all Palestinian and Arab organization.
6. These decisions do not conflict with the principle of cooperation with any activity held by the Israeli Human Rights Associations to support the Palestinian nation in its struggle for liberation and the establishment of a Palestinian state, and to declare their support for a fair and durable peace.

PNGO Network
Ramallah, Palestine
23/10/2000
Appendix IV:

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR YES PM

Interviews will be focused on getting information on specific P2P activities. If the interviewee has been involved in many activities, ask him/her to discuss the most successful and least successful activities. Information on the interviewees organization is important, but the focus is on the specific activities.

We should send the protocol out to interviewees in advance so that they can collect the specific information requested.

PART 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

(This information may be complicated by organizational structures.)
Name of Organization:
Directors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Established:</th>
<th>Registered?</th>
<th>Still in Operation?</th>
<th># of Employees:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Y/N</td>
<td>Y/N</td>
<td>Y/N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Personal information:
How did you get involved in this work?
Why?
Has your outlook changed as a result of your work in this field?

PART 2: GENERAL P2P QUESTIONS

Could you define P2P as you understand it?

What is the purpose of P2P activities?

What criteria do you use in determining success for P2P projects?

(For heads of organizations): How would you design a coherent P2P strategy?

Which are the most important population groups with whom you worked?

Which population groups should be worked with in the future?
What were the main problems in implementing a P2P strategy?
Pre-intifada?
During intifada?

What will be the main problems in implementing a P2P strategy when the intifada ends?

(Use Intifada sheet for more detailed questions as necessary)

**General evaluations**
If there were a renewed Peace Process what would you recommend doing with regard to P2P activities?

Do you think that P2P activities in general had an impact on the public? Why? Why not?

How could P2P activities in general have a bigger impact on the public?

Was any evaluation of organization’s PTP activity conducted?
If so, how was this conducted? (internally/external professional or agency/combination)

How often was this done?

What can/should be done now with regard to P2P activities? If funding were not an obstacle, what would you do?

**PART 3: SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES**

How many P2P activities have you organized?

Please review your most successful and least successful activities:

Ask the following *italicized* questions for each activity:

**General Data:**
- Name:
- Organization:
- Activity Description:
  (For office: Type of Activity:)
- Date of Activity:
- Donor:
Amount of Grant:
Partner organization:
Number of participants by nationality:

**Participants:**
How and Why are the participants of the organization’s programs/projects selected?
Is the selection of participants based on individual eligibility or is it a more universal or inclusive procedure?

What is the national/ethnic/religious background of participants in the organization’s P2P programming?
Why?

How would these participants be classified according to age (i.e. youth, college students, adults etc.)?
Why?

What is the socio-economic (class) background of most of the participants?

Would these participants be characterized as representing social “elites” or grassroots?
Why?

**Facilitators:**
How were the facilitators selected?

Were the facilitators members of or affiliated with the organization or were they contracted/recruited from outside the organization?

Were these facilitators/coordinators provided with any kind of special training for this purpose?

What was the national/ethnic/religious background of these facilitators/coordinators?

Was the facilitation/coordination performed by members of one or both nationalities?

What was the percentage of facilitators in terms of gender (men/women)?
Does the organization attach any significance to their gender?

**Location/Language:**
Where was the activity conducted?
Was it in a “neutral” venue, a single uni-national setting, or alternating uni-national venues?
In which language was the activity conducted (Hebrew, Arabic, English or a mixture thereof)?

**Describe the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian contact in this activity:**

How many times did the participants meet?
How long was each meeting?
Was this a one time activity or an ongoing activity?
Who ran the activity?
Who initiated the activity?
Who planned the activity?
How would you evaluate the partnership at the organizational level?

**Working with partners**

Did you work with partners on the other side?

How were the finances handled between the two sides?

What lessons did you learn with regard to working with partners?

What recommendations would you offer with regard to working with a partner organization?

**General questions about this activity:**

What was the purpose/aim of this activity?

Was the activity publicized in the media?

How, where, content?

What was the result of making use of the media?

Could you provide us with copies of your media exposure?

Did the activity have a multiplier effect?

Did your activity fit into a coherent peacemaking strategy?

Did people who participated in the activity maintain contact amongst themselves following the activity?

If yes, could you describe how this took place?
Do you believe that this activity contributed to peace, to mutual understanding, to the peace process?
Why?

What problems did you encounter?

Did your activity include people who were not part of the peace camp?
Was this a consideration?

**Evaluation/Lessons:**
How would you evaluate the results of this activity?

Did this activity achieve its goals?

What lessons did you learn from the activity?

Would this P2P programming be characterized as short or long term?

What would you differently if you did this a second time?

Would you repeat this project?

Would you recommend this project to another organization?

Do you have any other comments?

Are there questions we should have asked you?